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PREFACE 
The central focus of this dissertation is to analyse whether adopting Indian 
federal model will solve the deadly ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka or not. In the 
light of the history of ethnic conflict and the debate on its possible solution, this 
can be seen as a major breakthrough, both from the side of the LTTE as well as 
the Sri Lankan government. The peace talks and the process of negotiating a 
settlement of the twenty years-old ethno-political war in Sri Lanka requires 
ideas for the reformation of the political system, that is suitable to 
accommodate the interests and grievances of the two conflicting parties as well 
as other minority groups. For this purpose, the study has been divided into five 
chapters, followed by a brief conclusion. 
Chapter-1 deals with the theoretical aspect of ethnic conflict. Five different 
theories of International Relations namely Realist, Liberalist, Marxist, 
Constructivist and the most recent Democratic Peace Theory have been 
discussed to analyse various dimensions of ethnic conflict. 
Chapter-2 examines the genesis and nature of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. For 
the better assessment of its origin, it is divided into two parts, the pre-
independence scenario tracing from the ancient time to till 1948, and the post-
independence period. 
Chapter-3 focuses on the State responses to ethnic conflict: how the Sri 
Lankan government has responsed to this violent conflict from time to time. 
Various strategies have been adopted in order to deal with the situation such as. 
the use of force, enactment of law (legal response), political dialogue, and 
through constitutiona] arrangement. 
Chapter-4 tries to examine whether adopting federal model based on Indian 
experience can lead to end this ethnic crisis. For this, the Indian Federal model 
is discussed in detail. Other solution models have also been discussed. 
Chapter-5 discusses about the major developments about the ongoing ethnic 
conflict in Sri Lanka in recent years. This chapter exclusively deals how 
internal politics has affected the peace process, the way the Government of Sri 
Lanka and the LTTE responsed to the peace process and the future of the 
process of ethnic conflict resolution in Sri Lanka. 
CHAPTER! 
ETHNIC CONFLICT: THE THEORETICAL DEBATE 
Ethnic Conflict: An OvervicAV 
Ethnic conflicts pose a serious danger to national and international 
peace and security. While the greater part of the twentieth centur}' was haunted 
by conflicts between states, since the 1990's, it is ethnic conflicts emerging 
within a nation-state that have gradually escalated into wars involving other 
states.' There is no doubt about it that ethnic diversity is a universal 
phenomenon. In the multi-ethnic society, ethnicity has been an important basis 
of social and political interaction. It has also given rise to ethnic cleavages of 
wide varieties in such societies. It has indeed become a major source of 
domestic tensions and conflicts, particularly in developing societies owing to 
numerous historical-cultural, socio-economic, developmental and political 
reasons.'^  
Some of the noted ethnic motivated conflicts are, Baluch, Punjabi, 
Pathan and Mohajir's in Pakistan, the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot in 
Cyprus, the Turk and Kurdish in Turkey, the Pashtuns,Uzbeg,Tajiks,Hazara 
and Turkmen in Afghanistan, the Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Hutu 
and Tutsi in Rwanda and the ethnic violence between Serbs, Croats and 
Bosnian in former Yugoslavia. Between 1946 and 2001, there have been 
around 50 ethnically motivated conflicts worldwide; by 2003, only 16 of them 
had been settled. Ethnic conflicts are extremely diverse, ranging from 
legitimate political, social, cultural, and economic grievances of disadvantaged 
ethnic groups to predatoiy agendas of states and small factions of elite, to so-
called national interests, to name but a few/ As organized ethnic groups 
confront each other, minorities and majorities alike, with and without the 
backing of state institutions, an important question is to what extent ethnic 
conflicts are actually about ethnicity and to what extent ethnicity is merely a 
convenient common denominator to organise conflict groups in the struggle 
over resources, land, or power.'* 
The mobilisation of ethnic groups, fomiation of political organisations 
on ethnic lines and politicisation of ethnic groups and ethnic conflicts and 
movements are becoming critical factors in politics. It may be pointed out here 
that the ethnic mobilisation takes place when political and economic structures 
become competitive and the affirmative discrimination by the state makes some 
groups privileged and others deprived. It is in this way that ethnic competition, 
cleavages and conflicts become a serious challenge for the state. Thus ethnic 
mobilisation and conflicts are a problem of both developed and developing 
countries, although it is more prominent and complex in the developing 
countries.^ 
Ethnic/Ethnicity: A Conceptual Framework 
The word 'ethnic', derived from the Greek word 'ethnikos',tha{ refers 
to: (a) 'nations not converted in Christianity: heathens, pagans'; (b) races or 
large groups of people having common traits and customs; or (c) groups 'in an 
exotic primitive culture'.^ Thus the word "ethnic" does not necessarily refer to 
an anthropological difference between peoples. Rather, ethnicity has more to 
do with self-perception (identity) and "subjective sense of shared identity based 
on objective cultural or regional criteria".' 
In other words, ethnicity refers to a "Group of people who define 
themselves as distinct from other groups because of cultural differences." Gurr 
defines ethnicity as "Groups whose core members share a distinctive and 
enduring collective identity based on cultural traits and the way of life that 
matter to them and to others with whom they interact". He specifies tive 
cultural traits by which ethnic groups can be reliably identified: (1) language or 
dialect, (2) social customs, (3) religious beliefs, (4) physical appearance, and 
(5) region of residence.^ 
It is believed that human beings have a tendency to associate themselves 
with one another around shared religion, race, language, and cultural traditions. 
These symbols provide identity called ethnic identity. It becomes more 
pronounced when such an ethnic group also has a regional identity. Ethnicity is 
to use these symbols for the mobilisation of a group in order to achieve certain 
socio-economic and political objectives.'** 
Theories of Ethnic Conflict 
As far as theoretical aspect of ethnic conflict is concerned, it can be 
stated that ethnicity has become a real issue in international relations, since 
ethnic conflicts for various reasons spill over interstate borders, thereby posing 
threats to global security. There are different theories for the understanding of 
ethnic conflicts. These are discussed as under. 
1. Realism 
2. Liberalism 
3. Marxism 
4. Constructivism 
5. Democratic Peace Theory 
1. Realism:- There are two realist traditions regarding conflict in international 
state system. According to the Classical Realism, state is the main source of 
conflict and insecurity to any state comes form out-side of state boundaries that 
means other "states". Because they highlight state as the main actor in 
international system, the global system is anarchic rather than hierarchial. Thus 
Classical Realism's state oriented international politics seems to deny the 
existence of ethnicity as a source of conflict.'' 
Recent attempts by Realists to come to grips with ethnic conflict expose 
the conceptual shortcomings of Classical Realism. The Neo-Realists argue that 
it is not just the states responsible for insecurity in international politics rather 
non-state actors are also one of the major sources of international conflict. One 
of them is ethnic group or ethnicity. For example, some Realists suggest that 
the appeal to chauvinistic ethnic sentiments result from the need to mobilise the 
population in the face ol a threatening international environment. 
Moreover, if a State loses its ability to regulate an ethnic conflict, the 
problem becomes a structural 'security dilemma" because it could invite 
external intervention. The problems with such an analysis then becomes the 
treatment of an ethnic group (particularly during times of conflict) as rational 
and unitar>'actors.'"^ 
2. Liberalismr-Liberal theory on ethnic conflict differs from the Realist 
tradition. Realist highlighted the role of 'state' and 'non-state actors' (that is 
ethnic groups) as the units of anarchy/conflicts in the state system, while 
Liberals argue that neither the state nor the ethnic groups are the cause for 
conflict in state system. They focus on international system as the cause for 
ethnic conflict. They say that international system lacks friendship and co-
operation among the states and their units. If there is trade and co-operation, 
and international organisations promote friendship and treaty, there will be no 
place for ethnic conflict.'^ 
Hill and Rothchild argue that the power vacuum caused due to the 
end of colonialism, and the end of Cold War at international level produced 
higher rates of ethnic conflict in many parts of the world. Marc's adds that 
ethnic conflict can be a manifestation of the lack of interdependence,'^ but this 
lack of interdependence becoming subsumed under the relentless march of 
globalisation and the exchange of ideas about interdependence and common 
security. 
The theory and practice of state sovereignty are diminishing away 
because, the world appears to be fragmenting into ever-smaller political units in 
order to accommodate the vociferous demands for autonomy from groups who 
reject the legitimacy of existing state boundaries. East Timor is a case in point. 
True, both the trends seem to substantiate claims that the principle of state 
sovereignty, with its emphasis on territorial integrity is under threat from 
profound structural transformations.^' 
More and more ethnic groups are fighting for small states of their own 
in order to escape what they see as the oppressive impositions of centralised 
State in which they perceive themselves marginalised. The notion of liberalist 
view is that ethnic conflicts often emerge where attempts are made to create 
'nations' within the boundaries of centralised States in the name of 
modernisation.* 
Liberal theory suggests that when ethnic groups trade together; they 
become interdependent, and once they routinely interact in institutional setting, 
it is less likely that they would engage in ethnic conflict.'^ 
3. Marxism:-Marxist theory on ethnic conflict differs from Realist and 
Liberalist assumptions. According to them, the root cause for every conflict lies 
in material well being. They highlight that matter is the principle factor in 
creating the division between one ethnic group to another. If one ethnic group 
controls the means of production and country's wealth, its develops a tendency 
to rule over another ethnic group who posseses no wealth or means of 
production. Poor ethnic groups serve as a labour force employed by the affluent 
ethnic group. Marxists see capitalism as the central cause of ethnic conflict and 
they further argue that capitalism would create a wide income gap in the 
society ultimately leading to the division of the ethnic composition of the 
society that is between tiie 'haves'( property liolding ethnic group) and 'have-
nots' (ethnic group of working class). 
So the basis of ethnic conflict according to Marxist in international system is 
material wealth, if one ethnic group. controls the wealth of the country, it 
hegemonies the country's politics and suppresses the other ethnic group who is 
in minority in the country. This relationship between ethnic group is that of the 
dominant-subordinate, exploiting-subjugated one. But this can be overthrown 
by a radical change in the society with the help of class consciousness in a 
particular ethnic group. 
4. Constructivisin:-Basically Constructivism does not refer to a unified theory 
like other international relation theories. Constructivism probably gives the 
most analytic leverage on ethnic conflict. According to Constructivism, 
ethnicity is less a physical trait and more an aspect of an individual's identity. 
This could then be interacted with psychological theories about hatred and 
violence. Constructivists argue that the social world is a product of human 
consciousness consisting of different kind of communicative idioms that 
congeal around some form of community. 
The social world is inter-subjectively constituted: it is made by people 
who live there in a manner that they wish to understand and relate to. The 
social world is predicated on the material. However, the material entities 
become meaningful 'things' through the ideas or beliefs that people come to 
have about them. Even in the hard world of military security, 'meaning' rules. 
Thus security is not a matter of brute physical assets, the material attributes 
defining capabilities are also important. But what is unquestionably prior is the 
understanding people develop of these capabilities.^"* 
The constructivist notion of inter-subjectivity involves both hamiony 
and discord. If community is a positive imagination of a perceived sense of 
collective identity, it is also simultaneously a process of otherisation, for any 
identity is logically a contrast to its other. Identities both cohere and displace. 
While identities may be shared to some extent, beyond a point they tend to 
become exclusive. The focus on identity thus helps constructivist to consider 
both the dynamics of differentiation and the politics of integration. 
Constructivists do not freeze identities as settled. Identities are social 
constructs that change if people bearing them wish to alter them. Thus, in the 
ethnicity or nationalism of exclusion, the dominant group imposes its own 
values on others or excludes other on sharing of powers.^'' Ethnic separatist 
tendencies have fuelled inter-state rivalries even when ethnic contiguity was 
not a feature. Here two cases give clear illustrations of a community defining 
itself by ethnicity in resisting the policies of the state: the Tamil ethno-
nationalism in Sri Lanka and the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) in Sindh 
province of Pakistan.'^' 
5. Democratic Peace Theory:-The 'Democratic Peace Theory's' argument on 
ethnic conflict is based on two major assumptions:-
!0 
(a) Democratic states experience less ethnic conflicts than non-democratic 
states, because democracy as a system of conflict management, allows for the 
resolution of social conflicts through electoral and legislative arenas, replacing 
open confrontation on the battlefield for a seemingly unending process of 
bargaining and negotiation within the rules of the democratic game. In other 
words, democracies do not kill their own people. Moreover, democratic 
institutions offer ongoing opportunities and incentives for the continuation of 
bargaining and negotiation among parties in conflict. 
(b) Even if some democratic countries face ethnic problems, they still manage 
to contain it because when democratic peace mechanism is introduced after 
ethnic conflict, it can serve as a linkage between democracy and conflict 
management. It can guarantee democracy and manage conflicts in deeply 
divided societies.'^ ^ Moreover democratic participation and responsiveness 
makes resolution of conflict without violence possible. 
There is no doubt about it that ethnic identity is a significant barrier to 
striking a democratic compromise. When absolute claims for self-
determination and interdependence clash with inflexible position on territorial 
integrity, there is little chance for compromise on basic principles of 
democracy as an alternative to war. However it is also important to mention 
that democracy requires a basic consensus on a future of living together.^" That 
is why most democratic countries in the world are also multi-ethnic societies. 
Thus different theories have different perspectives on ethnic conflict. 
But they are not mutually exclusive. They can be studied together to have a 
broader perspective on ethnic conflict as the case of Sri Lanka suggests in our 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER-2 
ETHNIC CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA: GENESIS AND NATURE 
Introduction to the Chapter: 
Ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is known to everyone, which the island 
nation has been facing since its independence. Among the deadliest ethnic 
conflicts of the world, this conflict basically happened between the island's two 
major ethnic groups: the Sinhalese and the Tamils. This chapter is divided into 
two parts. The first part examines the root cause of the on-going ethnic conflict 
in Sri Lanka, and second part deals its nature or intensity. But before we take 
up the genesis of this conflict, let us first discuss the major ethnic groups in Sri 
Lanka. 
Major Ethnic Groups: 
Sri Lanka, a small but smart island in the Indian Ocean consists of 
65,610 sq.km in area approximately and is located at the foot of the South 
Asian subcontinent' Known as Ceylon until 1972, Sri Lanka is heterogeneous 
in social composition, heterogeneity being reflected in the different ethnic 
groups, religious faiths, and different languages spoken in the island^. 
On ethnic or racial composition, the island comprises the majority 
Sinhalese (about 74 percent of the total population), followed by Sri Lankan 
Tamils (12.6 percent), Indian Tamils/Plantation Tamils (5.5 percent), and 
others such as the Malays, Berger, Europeans, Afghans, Baluchis and Chinese 
(0.8 percent).^ 
On lingual ground, majority Sinhalese speak the Sinhalese, one of 
the principal languages of the island, while the Tamils and a majority of Moors 
(Muslims) speak the Tamil language. English is however the common language 
of the administration."* 
So far as religion is concerned, a majority of Sinhalese follow 
Buddhism, ^ the non Buddhist Sinhalese who are mainly Catholics or other 
Christian sect are about 5 percent of the population, ^ while Tamils and 
Muslims follow Hinduism and Islam respectively. Thus the island may, 
therefore, be likened to an ethnological museum of diversity with respect to 
face, language and religion.^All this clearly reveals the muhi-racial, multi-
religious, multi lingual character of Sri Lankan society. 
A Historical Overview of Formation of tlie Sri Lankan People: 
From archaeological and historical sources, there is no doubt that 
both the Sinhala and Tamil people have ancient roots in the island but it is 
difficult to say who came first.^According to the Mahavamsa, one of the 
principal sources of the reconstruction of the early history of Sri Lanka, the 
Sinhala race originated in the island with the arrival of Vijaya and his 700 
companions sometime in the 5^^ century B.C. They were all from the Northern 
India. Later migrations were from Bengal and Orissa as well."* They belong to 
the Aryan family generally habitant of Indian-subcontinent. Sinhalese were the 
descendant of 'Sinha' which refer to the lion."The Chinese travellers such as 
Fa-Hien in 411 A.D and Huien Tsang in 629 A.D, had referred to it as 
'Sinhale', 'Singhalen' or 'Seng-ka-io', means the island of the lion 
people.'^Majority Sinhalese practice Buddhism which was introduced to the 
island by Emperor Ashoka of India by sending a Buddhist missionary under the 
leadership of his son Mahendra in the third century B.C which subsequently 
became the State religion. Along with the religion, Buddhist education system 
was transplanted in the island and became the dominant force which shaped the 
cultura] traditions of the islanders.'^ 
Although, like the Aryans, the Sri Lankan Tamils who belong to the 
Dravidian family migrated from Peninsular India more specially from the 
Southern Indian State of Tamil Nadu, but it is hard to prove the exact period of 
the first Dravidian settlements in Ceylon.''*According to the same historical 
source, the origin of the Tamils, can be traced to the 3"^  century B.C.'"'They 
settled in Ceylon before the arrival of the Indo-Aryans in the wake of Prince 
Vijaya's expedition in the 5"^  century B-C."" There is no point of doubt that 
Tamil migration in Sri Lanka was started when Chola chieftain named Elara 
invaded the island in the 2"*^  century B.C and conquered the Sinhalese kingdom 
of Anuradhapura and ruled the kingdom for 44 years. According to the 
Sinhalese point of view, the Sinhalese settlement in the island is before the 
1 7 
Tamil settlement. 
Despite the explanations of Sinhalese scholars, the Tamil point of 
view also receives greater attention. According to the noted Tamil lawyer and 
rebel ideologue S.P.Ruthramoorthy "Vijaya's first act was a genocide of the 
Tamils people and afterward he founded the Sinhala race and 
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kingdom"/^There is no doubt that both the Sinhalese and Tamils are migrants 
from India, but racially they are different. Sinhalese belongs to Indo-Aryan 
family while Tamils belongs to the Dravidian family. 
From Colonialism to Independent: Entry of European Powers in the 
Island 
Colonialism is the general phenomena experienced by most of the 
South Asian States. Sri Lanka also experienced the taste of colonialism which 
started from the first landmark arrival of Portuguese in 1505. The Portuguese 
arrival marked the beginning of a 300-year of colonial rule on the island. After 
Portuguese, Dutch came to the island in 1656, followed by Britishers in 1796. 
The Britishers left: the island in 1948. The British era was regarded the most 
effective period than the previous two European nations in Sri Lankan 
history.''^Now we will turn our attention as how British rule impacted the 
island's ethno-political equation which was manifestated in the fonn of ethnic 
clashes between Sinhalese and Tamils and widened the gulf between the two. 
Ethnic Relations During British Rule—Pre-Independence Scenario 
The British rule started from 1796 and came to an end in the year 
1948. During this period, the British introduced a typical colonial 
administrative system and on education in which English language was given a 
top priority. Christianity was encouraged in the form of the Anglican Church. 
The upper-class of the Sri Lankan society adopted the Christian religion as a 
customary practice. They also adopted English language as well as Western 
way of living style just to show their loyalty to their colonial master. 
!8 
Consequently, the Sri Lankan culture, traditions, custom and belief were 
neglected during British regime. They (British) ignored the Buddhist and 
Hindu religions and damaged their place of worship by taking over the land 
and place and declared them governmental property. Tamil and Sinhalese were 
the linguafranca of the vemarable sections of the Sri Lankan society. Buddhist 
day of prayer was (the poya day) not celebrated on Sunday but another day of 
the week, and the national holidays were not celebrated according to country's 
declared day but on Christian religious holidays.^'lt is a fact that the British 
Empire was perhaps the least open to "diversity" because race was central to its 
functioning. As compared to the Portuguese and the Dutch who were no better 
in other respects, but certainly they allowed a far greater degree of contact and 
intermixing than the Britishers. 
British Policy of Favoritism and Discrimination: An Instrument for Divide 
and Rule 
It was the general feature of British rule in South Asia to adopt a 
policy of divide and rule based on the instruments of favoritism meaning 
thereby preferential treatments to Sri Lankan Tamils and at the same time 
discrimination with Sinhalese people because Tamils were more competent and 
productive as compared to Sinhalese. If we look to the demographic map of Sri 
Lanka, we will find that the traditional Tamil dominated areas in Sri Lanka are 
Northern and Eastern Provinces (see MAP-I) which being a dry zone, was 
unfavourable for plantation as well as other economic activities such as trade 
and business. As compared to Northern and Eastern Provinces, the low-country 
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areas which is mostly dominated by Sinhalese, are fertile wet-zone favourable 
for plantation and other commercial activities. Due to this geographical reason, 
majority Tamils of Northern and Eastern Provinces prefered state employment 
and other professions rather than in plantation and business and trade, but it is 
vice-versa in the case with low-country Sinhalese who explored and searched 
new economic opportunities in agriculture and trade rather than governmental 
jobs. 
For promoting Western education and English language in Sri Lanka, 
the Britishers established an efficient network of missionary schools in the 
Tamil dominated areas in particular and rest of the country's in general thus 
they were not interested to educate the Sinhalese people. The British 
Government facilitated the spread of higher education and training among the 
Tamils who were thus equipped for running the country's administration and 
placed in other professional services as well. Inevitably, therefore, the British 
Government favoured the Ceylon Tamils with high positions in administration, 
even in business, with the result that they stood disproportionately represented 
in public services. But since the low-country Sinhalese were conspicuously 
successful in exploiting the economic opportunities available in agriculture and 
business and commerce, no healthy competition developed between them till 
the end of the 19' century, and the Tamils occupied mostly seats in 
government services. In the beginning of 20"^  century when low-country 
Sinhalese turned towards State employment, unhealthy competition started 
between them and the Tamils resented this new encroachment upon their 
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hitherto regarded exclusive monopoly in eveiy sector of the State employment. 
Hence, this lead to the inevitable clash of interests and cemented the divide 
between them.^^ 
Language Policy: A Discriminatory Approach 
The British Government in Sri Lanka had used the Language Policy as 
an instrument of ethnic discrimination. Under the British imperial rule, English 
had been the official language of the country's administration and served as the 
language of professions, commerce, higher education, and even of politics until 
1930s. Obiviously, those who received their education in English medium 
enjoyed a privileged social status and singular occupational opportunities in 
government jobs and other professional services. Such a status and 
opportunities then favoured the educationally advanced Tamils who learnt 
English in missionary institutions, which were mostly opened in the Tamil 
dominated Northern and Eastern Provinces, while the Sinhalese, who were 
denied the same facilities for learning English, consequently remained 
educationally backward, and lagged behind them in several opportunities 
despite the fact that they constituted the highest percentage of the country's 
total population. This, led the Sinhalese to launch a 'Swabhasa' (or own 
language) movement prior to independence and it was decided that English was 
gradually to be replaced as the official language by both Sinhalese and 
Tamils." 
Post-Independence Scenario 
On 4 February 1948, Sri Lanka gained independence from Britain as a 
political unit transcending ethnic, religious and linguistic differences.^'' There 
were no mass struggle and uprising from the side of Sri Lanka against the 
British government in order to liberate their country from the hand's of an 
imperial power. That is the reason why Sri Lanka is regarded as a model 
colony in South Asia. As Parliamentarian Leslie Goonewardena remarked in 
this context.... "We did not have mass struggles against imperialism in order to 
win independence. If the Sinhalese as well as the Tamils had gone to jail in 
thousands, for the cause of freedom movement, a consciousness not of 
Sinhalese or Tamil nationalism, but of a Sri Lankan nationality would have 
been built up in that struggle".'^ ^ 
The first Post-Independence government was led by the United 
National Party (UNP) by its most dynamic leader D.S.Senanayake, popularly 
known as the 'Father of the Nation', who ruled the island country from 1948 to 
1956.When UNP took the command in 1948, there was a ver}' narrow and non-
aggressive view regarding nationalism in the island, because both Tamils and 
Sinhalese feared that one was gaining an unfair constitutional advantage over 
the other. Although the situation remained somewhat fragile and uneasy during 
this period, a compromise in regard to power-sharing was reached by the two 
communities. The Sri Lankan Tamils had some significant representation in the 
D.S.Senanayake Government.^* 
However, the future political status of the Indian Tamils who were 
different from Sri Lankan Tamils loomed large as an issue in the political 
dynamics of the island, and it became highly emotional when the Sinhalese 
ruling elites undertook measures, to progressively curtail down the basic 
political rights of the Indian Tamils. They feared that the Indian Tamil votes 
were a threat to the electoral prospects of the dominant Sinhala party that is 
UNP. The Sri Lankan government under the Prime Ministership of Don 
Stephen Senanayake, enacted the Citizenship Acts of 1948 and 1949. They 
were made rigid and restrictive primarily to deny citizenship to all those who 
were not indisputably indigenous.^^Thus the majority of Indian Tamils had 
found it difficult to survive due to the enactment of these Acts that made them 
stateless all of a sudden. 
Issue of Citizenship for Indian Origin Tamil/Plantation Tamils 
The era of mass discrimination against Indian Tamils started with the 
beginning of the implementation of a draconian Citizenship Act of 1948 that 
deprived citizenship to the Tamils of Indian origin. This Act (No. 18) declared 
them as "stateless persons".^*'ln no other country, the People of Indian Origin 
(PIO) had been humiliated to such a severe extent as in Sri Lanka. "A large 
number of'Indian Tamils' who were encouraged by the British to migrate over 
from the Indian state of Tamil Nadu during 19'*" century to work on the up-
country tea and rubber estates in the island had been deprived of civic rights'" '^ 
for nearly six decades. 
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The electoral factor was the foremost reason for the inclusion of such 
provisions in the citizenship legislation, and in 1949 the Indian Tamil 
plantation workers were disenfranchised, the UNP government defended its 
measures on the following ground that... 
(i) the Indian Tamils were not assimilated with the indigenous population; 
(ii) most of them did not display the intention of making Sri Lanka their 
permanent home and, as such, were the 'residents' and not 'domiciles' of the 
island; 
(iii) they did not forget or forsook their home country, and, thus continued to be 
loyal to India; 
(iv) the future Indian leaders would use the Indian Tamils as a fifth column in 
the island if they were granted citizenship; 
(v) the conferrnent of citizenship on the Indian Tamils would "reduce the 
Sinhalese to beggary; 
(vi) the "citizenisation' of the PIO would lead to the swamping of the Sinhalese 
and effacement of their identity as nationals of Sri Lanka. 
Subsequently, Sri Lanka took the stand that all those persons who did not 
qualify for the island's citizenship were to repatriated to India as they were its 
citizen ab initio^ Due to the implementation of this Act, about 9, 00,000 
Indian Tamils, who had been the backbone of the island's plantation economy 
were worstly affected.^'' 
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Sinhala Nationalism or Buddhist Hegemony-A Nexus of a Religio-
Nationaiist Movement 
Ethnic rivalry gained momentum in 1956 when the UNP lost the election 
and the SLFP won 51 seats in Parliament.^^ The SLFP created in 1951 as a 
breakaway from the UNP under bourgeois nationalist Solomon West Ridgevvay 
Dias Bandaranaike. The basic ideological differences between the two was that 
while the UNP during its first two decades was associated with liberalism, pro-
Americanism and anti-Communism, the SLFP's main emphasis was the 
protection of Buddhist and Sinhala culture.^^The emergence of Sinhala 
Nationalism dates back to during 1948 when organisation such as 'Sinhala 
Mahasabha' and 'Eksath Bhikkhu Peramuna' presented a narrow exclusivist 
nationalism in Sri Lankan society for the purpose strengthening the upcoming 
Sinhala nationalism in Sri Lanka. Their dream became reality when the Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party's(SLFP) success in the 1956 elections with the support 
of the Bhikkhus,was described as 'Sinhalese nationalist resurgence" and 
regarded as an expression of 'Sinhala nationalism'."^^ 
The victory of Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) was described in effect a 
revolt against the Western value orientations of the governing United National 
Party (UNP) and its demand for a prime position to the language, religion and 
culture of the Sinhalese community.^'^B.H.Farmer, in his examination of the 
social basis of nationalism in Sri Lanka, argued that 'there was little that was 
original or unique about the second wave of nationalism' which, according to 
him, was 'exclusively Sinhalese'.'^ '* 
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Sinhala Only Act: 
'Sinhala Only' Bill came before the House within three months of Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party's accession to power in 1956. The elected government 
with the help of majority seats passed the 'Sinhala Only' Bill which later on 
became an Act. This law made Sinhala as the official language of Sri Lanka. 
Previously, English had been the language of government, and it was also the 
linguafranca of educated Sri Lankan elite. But rest of the Sri Lankans could not 
understand or speak it. The Tamils became angry over what they saw as the 
government effort to exclude them from public life. The Sinhalese gave their 
argument in favour of 'Sinhala Only Act' that they constituted the majority in 
country's population.'**Now it became compulsory in all schools to use 
Sinhalese as the medium of instruction.'*^ 
The Tamils perceived such a shift in language policy as a breach of trust. 
Consequently, the Federal Party (FP) emerged as the spokesman of Ce}'lon 
Tamils.'^ ^Over the next two years; riots had been taken place between the two 
communities. The Tamils protested the official relegation of their language and 
culture to second-class status, as well as government policy of prohibition on 
the entry of Tamils into higher studies and government jobs.'*'* They demanded 
that the government should give equal status to the Tamil language vvith 
Sinhalese.'''To persuade the Federal Party (FP) led campaign against language 
discrimination, Mr. Bandaranaike broadcasted a speech offering four new 
concessions regarding the language issue on June 12, 1957. 
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(i) The Tamils would enjoy the right to education in their mother tongue up to 
University level; 
(ii) They would be allowed to appear at entrance examinations for the public 
services in their own language but would not be permanent employment unless 
they acquired sufficient knowledge of Sinhalese; 
(iii) They could be free to correspond with Government officials in their own 
language and 
(iv) Some local authorities in the Northern and Eastern Provinces would be 
permitted to transact their business in Tamil.'*^ 
The Federal Party unanimously rejected Mr. Bandaranaike's above four 
points but desired a peaceful settlement on the language issue. The Prime 
Minister and the Federal Party (FP) leader, Chelvanayakam met to discuss the 
language issue. The discussion which began on June 26 ended on July 25 with 
a compromise settlement. On the linguistic issue, it was decided that Tamil 
should be recognized as a language of 'a national minority', and it should be 
the official language of Northern and Eastern provinces."*^ 
Discrimination in the Field of Education 
Another sort of discrimination against the Tamils was in the field of 
education. This was made through the 'District Quota System' and 
'Standardisation System' in order to prevent Tamil students to take admission 
in higher studies. According to a survey of the University of Ceylon, between 
1970 and 1975. the percentage of the Tamil entrants had been declined from 
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40.8 to 13.2 in the engineering course and from 37 to 20 in medicine. In the 
agricukural course, the decline was even sharper. According to Marga Institute 
report, 75 percent of seats available, at the University level in 1983 were 
occupied by the Sinhalese students, and only 19.3 percent, by the Tamils. 
The Tamil students were intellectually better equipped for admission to 
such courses like medical, engineering, and physical sciences, but in reality, 
they lagged far behind from their Sinhalese counterparts in respect of 
admission to these courses at Universities. 
Discrimination in the Field of Employment 
In the field of employment, the Sinhalese-led government started 
discrimination against the Tamils since independence because the first UNP led 
government formulated an indirect discriminatory policy in the government 
employment sector as to prevent the Tamils to compete. Language policy was 
one of those weapons of Sinhalese led government which prevented Tamil 
candidate to secure a governmental job. Knowledge of Sinhalese language was 
made mandatory for a Tamil candidate to appear in competitive exam for Civil 
Services, despite the fact that candidate attempted the test in his own mother 
tounge.Representation in Armed Services and Police Force was also ver>' low. 
Government policy towards Tamil's candidate was highly discriminatory in 
nature and even some time government did not consider it safe while recruiting 
Tamils to the Armed Forces and Police Forces during the period of ethnic 
violence. They were even discriminated in General Clerical Services 
Examination. Unemployment rate among the qualified Tamil's male was 41 
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percent in 1983 while among Sinhalese it was only 29 percent. Due to 
unemployment among Tamils, their economic life was adversely affected. 
Growing frustration due to government's discriminator}^ policy in State jobs led 
many towards violence as they joined the Eelam Movement, resulting is the 
formation of the militant youth movement in the northern region of the 
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country. 
Issue of Religion 
Although nature of Sri Lankan conflict is mainly ethnic, religious issues 
also played an important role. For instance, Mrs.Sirimavo Bandaranaike led 
SLFP government enacted a new Constitution for the country and changed the 
official name of the country from 'Ceylon' to the Sinhala version name i.e. 'Sri 
Lanka' and Buddhism was given primary place as country's official religion 
resulting in the active opposition from the Tamil people. The arrival of Prince 
Vijaya Singha in Sri Lanka was the coincidence with the Parinibbana (or the 
passing away of Lord Buddha).This was according to Silva, "deliberate attempt 
to emphasize the historic role of the island as a bulwark of Buddhist 
civilisation". In the Republican Constitution of 1978, Buddhism was 
recognised and enjoyed a special position as well as State protection and foster. 
Tamils were not happy due to the inclusion of Buddhism in the country's 
Constitution because they thought that it undermined Hinduism, so they 
demanded Hinduism be given equal status in the Constitution as their religion 
was the second most popular religion of the country. Although the issue of 
religion did not constitute a serious factor in the rivalry between the two 
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communities, the Tamils perception was that Hinduism was denied the status of 
equality with Buddhism clearly added fuel to the fire. 
NATURE OF ETHNIC CONFLICT 
Tamil Youth Movement: 
When the entire door was closed for the Tamils and the government 
policies were biased and unfavourable then the only resort left before them was 
to take up arms in their hand and fight for their rights and grievances. The 
majority of Tamil youths who were unemployed due to severe anti-Tamil 
policies of the government in areas such as education and employment were 
totally frustrated and joined the Tamil Youth Movement.^' 
They launched a massive campaign against Sri Lankan government 
resulting in widespread communal violence throughout the country. Their 
movement was marginalised to some extent by moderate and democratic 
parties, such as the Federal Party (FP), the CWC and even the TULF. But 
subsequently, they were sidelined due to the harsh attitude of Tamil Youth 
Movement members. Some active and forceful guerrilla groups mainly 
consisting of young Tamils fought for the cause of justice for Tamil people in 
the country. When guerrilla activities started, their planning and strategies were 
weak in the early phase, but gradually they were better trained in guerrilla 
warfare. In 1970, they launched a violent attack on the government building, 
major installations and Sri Lankan armed forces.^ ^ 
Birth of the Lrr^: 
The youth movement that gained pace during 1970s later took the shape 
of a strong organisation called the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTEj.lt 
was established in 1972's by an eighteen-year old angr>' and desperate Tamil 
youth leader called Vellupillai Prabhakaran.^"^After the formations of'LITE', a 
series of associate Tamil organisations were formed such as the Tamil Eelam 
Liberation Organisation' (TELO) founded in 1973 by S.Thangathurai; Eelam 
Revolutionary Organisation of Students'(EROS) formed in 1975 by 
V.Balakumar; People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam'(PLOTE) 
founded in 1980 by Uma Maheswaran;and in 1981 K.Padmanabha formed 
Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front'(EPRLF).But among these 
organisations, LTTE was the most deadly one.^ '* 
Terrorism as an Instrument for Achieving the Goal for a Separate Eelam: 
The common goal of all groups was fighting against the government in 
order to liberate their Eelam.^'' But the Tamil population was made to believe 
that LTTE was the only organisation who was determined and capable of 
protecting and advancing the interests of the Sri Lankan Tamils. The LTTE 
systematically assassinated not only the member's of the Sri Lankan army and 
police officers but also the leaders of rival Tamil groups.^^ 
LTTE emerged as the sole organisation carrying the liberation war. In due 
course of time, Prabhakaran became a central figure of the Tamil insuiTCCtion 
and his militancy had given the Tamils a new spine. There-after, the unplanned 
and unorganised militant activities had turned into a full scale civil war.''' The 
LTTE found terrorism one of the most effective weapons in its struggle against 
the Sri Lankan state, because it did not have any trust on the majoritarian 
Sinhalese Government at Colombo. It began armed activities by carrying out 
deadly operations. Their first victims were Tamil civilians and liberal Tamil 
politicians vvho did not share their (LTTE) vision. They also carried out 
massacres of Sinhalese and Muslim civilians in the northeast because both 
communities did not share the LTTE's idea of Tamil Eelam (see MAP-II). It 
also exploded bombs in the capital city of Colombo^^ and subsequently brought 
the whole country under its target. 
Draconian Anti-Terror Act of 1979 and Horror Riots of 1981 & 1983: 
The Sri Lankan Government in order to prevent the spread of terrorism 
by the radical Tamil wing's 'LTTE' passed a legislation in the Parliament in 
1979 which was known as the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1979. Under this 
Act, governments perrnitted the state law & order machinery (that is, the army 
and the police) to arrest immediately and hold prisoners incommunicado for up 
to eighteen months without trial. They could also use various torture methods 
during interrogation.^' 
In April 1981, twenty-seven Tamil youths were arrested and held 
incommunicado. This incident added fuel to fire and the Tamil insurgents were 
more violent due to the draconian Terror Act which was biased and also against 
one particular ethnic community. They retaliated in response to this Act and 
staged a bank robbery, in the course of which two policemen were killed. In 
early June, local elections for District Development Council were announced in 
the Northern Province but later on it was postponed because during the election 
campaign, a candidate and two police officers were killed.^" 
In response to this incidence, policemen went on a rampage in the Tamil 
city of Jaffna burning the market area, the home of a Member of Parliament, 
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the TULF. headquarter and the Public Library containing 95,000 volumes. Due 
to the increase in violence the government declared emergency 61 
Another wave of communal violence broke out in August 1981 at 
Amparai, when the Tamil and the Sinhalese students clashed at a sport meet 
escalating into an attack by Sinhala peasant colonists on Tamil colonists and 
the burning of a Hindu temple. In connection with Amparai incident, another 
violence broke out in the town of Ratnapura famous for its gem-mining, in 
Negombo, a coastal town near Colombo, and in several plantation towns. All 
this happened in front of the policemen but none of them intervened to prevent 
Sinhalese mob that attacked on the Tamils until the declaration of the State of 
emergency on August 17, 1981." 
Riots of 1982 and 1983: 
Communal riots of 1982 and 1983 were highly organised in nature. 
Rioters mainly consisted of Sinhalese youth, chalked out the plan in a ver} 
effective manner before implementing them; they carried voter lists and 
address of Tamil owned shops, properties and occupants of houses. Gangs 
armed with weapons such as metal rods, knives and gasoline for their notorious 
act. Riots began in the capital city of Colombo and its spread to the towns of 
Gampaha, Kalutara, Kandy, Matale, Nuwara Eliya and Trincomalee. These 
places were the largest concentration of Sri Lankan Tamils as well as Indian 
Tamils. Shops and establishments, especially in the market areas of MataJe, 
Kandy, and Nuwara Eliya, were looted and burned. Government estimated 
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about death toll was of 350 but the actual figures were even larger than the 
governmental sources, the Tamil estimates showed about 2,000 and a million 
lost their homes, and jobs. It was reported that some fifteen reftigees camps in 
Colombo city alone accommodated from 80,000 to 100,000 peoples. The Sri 
Lankan Government told foreign diplomats that the country (Sri Lanka) needed 
homes, clothes, household items, and food for it riot affected peoples.^^ Apart 
from Tamil houses, there were systematic destruction of shops and commercial 
and industrial establishments, many of which employed Sinhalese labour.It was 
estimated that about 100 industrial plants were severely damaged or destroyed, 
including 20 garment factories. There was a vast economic losses estimated 
$300 million and 150,000 peoples have lost there jobs. '^* 
Country's well known industrialists such as K.Gunaratnam, whose major 
interest's areas are textile, trade, film distribution, and transportation: 
A.Y.S.Gnanam, who owned St.Anthony's Hardware, Syntex, and Asian Cotton 
Mills; R.Maharaja, whose interest ranging from cosmetics to Mahaweli 
Scheme project, and the retail sector were the victims of riots. Some of the 
noted business houses such as Hirdaramanis and Jafferjees that belonged to the 
Hindu Sindhi and the Muslim Bohra mainly concentrated in Colombo were 
also the victims of riots. Industrial cities of Ratmalana and Peliyagoda were 
converted into ashes. The rioters even targeted the Indian Overseas Bank, 
whose building and records were set ablaze, it was the principal bank used by 
Indian citizens in Sri Lanka and many Sri Lankans of Indian origin. Sri Lankan 
j D 
army even actively participated and encouraged arson and looting of 
commercial establishment and homes in Colombo and other places.^ '"" 
Thus it clearly shows that there was a complete failure of law and order, 
due to the active participation of police and army in riots. They were there to 
protect the law and order in the state but they acted as an agent and some time 
helped the armed gangs during riots. This makes it important to understand and 
analyse the nature of state response to ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka. 
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CHAPTER-3 
STATE RESPONSE 
In the preceding chapter, we have discussed the causes of ethnic 
conflict in Sri Lanka that resulted a harmful consequence in the island's ethno-
political environment. The creation of radical Tamil wing LTTE changed the 
ethno-political atmosphere of the island nation. Its demand for a separate state 
(Eelam) led to the rise of ethnic violence more intense because its cadres were 
armed with well equipped weapons and highly trained. 
LTTE's philosophy and thought is terrorism and terror as an 
instrument or means in pursuance of political goals that resulted a fear inflicted 
on unarmed, innocent people. Its most trusted leader Prabhakaran started his 
career with a bloodbath against not only Sinhala officials and civilians, but also 
fellow Tamil militants and political leaders. So elimination of terrorism is 
essential, and this cannot be done without addressing the causes, roots, and 
sources from where such conflicts originated. Almost all the contributions to 
this conflict in Sri Lankan case are rooted in poHtical marginalisation, socio-
economic deprivation and discrimination, ethnic, religion, regional and cultural 
suppression, neglect and so on. So in order to avoid these causes and coping 
with terrorism in Sri Lanka various strategies were pursued which are 
discussed in our state response. 
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RESPONSE STRA TEGIES 
The strategies pursued by Sri Lanka in responding to the ethnic 
conflict may fall into four broad categories. 
1. Strategy Based on the Use of Force 
2. Strategy Based on Legislative Framework 
3. Strategy Based on Political Accommodation 
4. Strategy Based on Constitutional Arrangement 
1. Strategy Based on the Use of Force 
Almost all the South Asian states pursued this strategy in their first 
response. The thrust of this strategy is to use superior counter-force to suppress 
terrorism and insurgency. The agencies employed in the use of force range 
from ordinary police to paramilitary and specialised forces as well as the 
regular armed forces of the country.' Sri Lanka also use armed forces against 
LTTE in order to combat terrorism. After independence, Sri Lanka was left 
with a tiny military force with outdated equipment. The infantry was armed 
with 303 rifles and a few Bren guns, while the pathetically weak navy and air 
force possessed only a few aircraft and boats. Due to this, they were used 
mainly to aid the police in times of civil unrest and to provide disaster relief 
However, under the stimulus of serious internal threats from the 1970s, mainly 
from LTTE and Tamil insurgency, the Sri Lankan forces gradually bolstered its 
strength in manpower, training and equipment.^ 
The strength of all the Sri Lankan security forces in 1983 was around 
31,000. (Army 11.000: Navy 2.960: Air force 2,600: Police 14,000).In 1987 it 
increased to 60. 000, including a police force of 23,500, about 18,000, Home 
Guards and a 6,000 strong Air Force. Notwithstanding the strengthening of the 
security forces, the LTTE by the latter part of 1986 virtually took control of the 
Jaffna peninsula and some parts of Trincomalee and made preparations to set 
up its own secretariat in Jaffna to coordinate the civil administration in the 
peninsula. To recapture the peninsula, the government launched "Operation 
Liberation" in the Jaffna Peninsula in May 1987. The security forces slowly 
advanced towards Vadamaracchi (the North Western part of the Jaffna 
peninsula) the stronghold of the Tamil militants after over-running the coastal 
town of Valvettiturai.After seven days of operations, these areas came under 
the Sri Lankan armed forces^due to their excellent tactical expertise in 
combating terrorism. In 1991, Sri Lankan Army seiged the famous Elephant 
Pass, and landed a relief force unit there to provide relief and aid materials to 
civilian population. In order to challenge the guerrilla warfare technique of 
LTTE, the Sri Lanka Forces (SLF) developed their Special Forces Unit. This 
Special Forces Unit named "deep-penetration unit", composed of highly trained 
group of men operating behind enemy lines, carrying out sabotage and 
ambushes on Tiger forces. In early 2000's, this unit caused considerable 
disruption to the LTTE's movements inside territory controlled by them."* 
On January 3 2009, the Sri Lankan Army recaptured the Kilinochchi 
from LTTE. The LTTE took control of Kilinochchi in 1990 when the Sri 
Lankan Army (SLA) withdrew its garrisons after the departure of the Indian 
Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF). The SLA gained control of the town followins 
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operations Sathjaya I, II, and III in September 1996. This town was again 
captured by Tigers in 1998. The defeat of the Tigers in Kilinochchi capped a 
series of military victories by the Sri Lankan forces.^ After the fall of 
Kilinochchi, Sri Lankan troops entered in 'Jaffna Peninsula' on January 4 via a 
Elephant Pass * and chalked out the plan to nab Prabhakaran. Beside active 
military operation, the Government of Sri Lanka has formulated legislative 
framework in order to control the tigers. 
2. Strategy Based on Legislative Framework 
In order to combat the LTTE sponsored terrorist violence in Sri Lanka, 
the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) enacted counterterrorism laws, which has 
been used to deal with any kind of disturbance—whether labour strikes, 
election violence, rioting, or insurgency—and not just in extraordinary 
circumstances. The Sri Lankan counterterrorism laws can be categories into 
five.^ 
a) Emergency Provisions 
b) Laws of Proscription 
c) The Criminal Justice Commission Act 
d) The Criminal Procedure (Special Provisions) Act 
e) Special Laws 
a) Emergency Provisions 
Emergency provisions are widely used to combat militancy. They are popularly 
known as "Emergency Regulations" declared under the Public Securit\-
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Ordinance (PSO) enacted just before independence to deal with the general 
strike of 1947.After independence, there was an amendment in 1959, 
influenced by the 1958 ethnic riots, conferred additional powers on the chief 
executive (the Prime Minister).The 1971 Janatha Vimukhthi Peramuna (JVP) 
insurrection led to the incorporation of the PSO into the 1972 Republican 
Constitution. The 1978 Constitution simply followed the footsteps of the 
previous Constitution, although the UNP government, which came to power in 
1977, made some changes to the emergency provisions by amending the PSO. 
Under the 1978 Constitution, the President is vested with extensive and 
wide powers to issue regulations. And no court of law can call into question the 
existence of a state of public emergency. The proclamation has only to be 
sanctioned monthly by Parliament in accordance with Article 155 of the 
Constitution. The regulations cover a wide range of activities, some with only 
or no relevance to national security.' Table 1 gives a chronology of declaration 
of emergencies since independence. 
b) Laws of Proscription 
This is another legislative framework to tackle the issues related to terrorism. 
Law of Proscription is a separate law used by Sri Lankan government for the 
Proscription of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and similar organisations 
Act No. 16 of 1978. This law gave the President the power to proscribe any 
organisation that create violence or indulge directly or indirectly in unlawful 
activity. There was no provision for the banned organisation to refute the 
charge or appeal against the ban. To the government's surprise, however, such 
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labeling did not prevent either militant activities or people from joining militant 
groups. It was this realisation that made the government repeal the act.'" 
The government thereafter did not bring in any exclusive law to ban any 
militant organisation; however, it made use of power under the Public Security 
Ordinance and Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) to proscribe organisations 
from time to time. The JVP was banned in 1983, immediately after the ethnic 
riots, using Emergency Regulations. Similarly, the LTTE was proscribed in 
January 1998 after an attack on the Dalida Maligawa (the Temple of Tooth in 
Kandy) by introducing the Emergency (Proscription) Regulations of 1998. " 
c) The Criminal Justice Commission Act 
On April 6, 1972, one year after the JVP rebellion, the United Front 
government passed the Criminal Justice Commission Act No. 14 of 1972, which 
provided for a Criminal Justice Commission to "enquire into generally the 
circumstances which led to the rebellion" to enquire and determine those 
guilty" and "to deal with those who are found guilty in the manner prescribed 
by the Act." Though the insurrection had begun on April 5, 1971, the period of 
offenses for trial was stated as being from January 1, 1968 to December 31, 
1971. The act was initially to be valid for eight years, and then extended for a 
further five years, if required. The rationale advanced for setting up a special 
tribunal was that "the practice and procedure of the ordinary courts are 
inadequate to administer criminal justice." Harsh provisions such as admission 
of confessions as evidence Section 11 (2) and absence of higher appeal were 
included.'^ 
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d) The Criminal Procedure (Special Provisions) Act 
On May 1978, the Criminal Procedure (Special Provisions) Law No. 15 had 
been passed. This was the first legislation made to deal with Tamil militancy. 
The main objective of the legislation was to "prohibit or restrict the release on 
bail by certain courts of persons who surrender or are produced in connection 
with the commission of certain offences, to prohibit the imposition of 
suspended sentences of imprisonment on, and the conditional release of, 
persons convicted or guilty of such offences and to provide for the imposition 
of a minimum punishment for such offences. The duration of law specified as 
one year, but it was extended annually and remains in force today, making it 
one of those temporary pieces of legislation that become permanent. The 
amendment of 1982 took away the discretion of granting bail from the judiciary 
and vested it in the attorney general, who is part of the executive. 
e) Special Laws 
With the rise of Tamil militancy, the ruling elite saw that there was a need for 
more special laws which exclusively deal with militancy. When UNP under 
J.R.Jayewardene, came to power in 1977, instituted numerous changes. The 
Constitution was changed, a presidential system was introduced; and markets 
were opened for desirable investment. But the atmosphere was not conducive 
for investments because due to the rise of Tamil militancy in the state. 
Jayewardene was of the view that for feasible environment for investment in 
the state and economic development terrorism in the country must be crushed. 
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He was very confident of crushing militancy by force but was not successful. 
Then he used all previous law's and security ordinance to combat terrorism but 
failed to produce adequate results. Jayewardene Government then introduced 
the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA). *'* 
The first and foremost objective of enacting the PTA was stated to be the 
"prevention of acts of terrorism in Sri Lanka, the prevention of unlawful 
activities of any individual, group of individuals, association, organisation or 
body of persons within Sri Lanka or outside Sri Lanka.The PTA was more 
draconian act than the previous acts, because the provisions included in this act 
was more harsh and stiff. Under this act, if some one is convicted, then the 
following provisions were applied. 
Provisions for seizure of the property of those convicted (Section 4), 
Arrest any person 'Section 6(1) (a)' 
Search of any premises or vehicle 'Section 6 (1) (b, c)' 
Seizure of any document 'Section (1) (d)' 
Prolonged detention 'Section 7and 9' 
Restriction of movement of a suspect 'Section 11 (1)' 
Trial without preliminary inquiry ' Section 15' 
Admissibility of confession as evidence 'Section 16' 
No allowance for bail (except in exceptional circumstances determined b} 
Court of Appeal) 'Section 19' 
Immunity of law enforcement personnel from prosecution 'Section 26' and 
Precedence of the PTA over all other written laws 'Section 28".'^ 
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The PTA \ '^as passed without giving the people an opportunity to debate 
and discuss the bill; even parliamentarians were not given an adequate chance 
to read the bill, and it was passed in a single day. The Sinhala majority viewed 
the PTA as the key to tackling "Tamil terrorism. As far as the moderate Tamil 
leadership, TULF, was concerned, it could not do much to prevent the PTA 
when it was in the form of a bill.*^ 
3. Strategy Based on Political Accommodation 
The response strategy based on political accommodation is highly 
complex in Sri Lankan context, although it can be said that no serious attempt 
was made in this direction before Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of 1987. The 
historic Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement was perhaps the first grand strategy that 
largely addressed the island's ethnic problem. This Agreement was signed 
between Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India and Sri Lankan 
President, Junius Richard Jayewardene in Colombo on July 29, 1987. The 
basic objectives of this agreement was to resolve the ethnic problem of the 
country, and the consequent end of violence, and for safety, well-being and 
prosperity of people belonging to all communities in Sri Lanka. 
In this context the following provisions were considered: 
(a) Desiring to preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri 
Lanka. 
(b) Acknowledging that Sri Lanka is multi-ethnic and a multi-lingual plural 
society consisting, inter alia, of Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims (Moors), and 
Burghers. 
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(c) Recognising that each ethnic group has a distinct cultural and linguistic 
identity which has to be carefully nurtured. 
(d) Recognising that the northern and the eastern provinces have been areas of 
historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples, who have at all 
times hitherto lived together in the territory with other ethnic groups. 
(e) Conscious of the necessity of strengthening the force contributing to the 
unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, and preserving its 
character as a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious plural society, in 
which all citizens can live in equality, safety and hamiony, and fulfill their 
aspirations. 
In the light of above agreement, the following provisions were made in order to 
resolve the ethnic conflict between Sinhalese and Tamils. 
(f) Since the government of Sri Lanka proposes to permit adjoining provinces 
to join to form one administrative unit and also by a referendum to separate as 
may be permitted to the northern and eastern provinces as outlined below. 
(g) During the period, which shall be considered an interim period (i.e. from 
the date of the elections to the provincial council, as specified in para 2.3 to the 
date of the referendum as specified in para 2.3) the northern and eastern 
provinces as now constituted, will form one administrative unit, having one 
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elected provincial council. Such a unit will have one governor, one chief 
minister and one board of ministers. 
(h) There will be a referendum on or before December 31, 1988 to enable the 
people of the eastern province to decide whether: 
(i) The eastern province should remain linked with the northern province as 
one administrative unit, and continue to be governed together with the northern 
province as specified in para 2.2 or 
(j) The eastern province should constitute a separate administrative unit having 
its own distinct provincial council v/ith a separate governor, chief minister and 
board of ministers. 
The President may, at his discretion, decide to postpone such a referendum, 
(k) All persons who have been displaced due to ethnic violence, or other 
reason, will have the right to vote in such a referendum. Necessary condition to 
enable them to return to areas from where they were displaced will be created. 
(1) The referendum, when held, will be monitored by a committee headed by 
the chief justice, a member appointed by the President, nominated by the 
Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL), and a member appointed by the President, 
nominated by the representatives of the Tamil speaking people of the eastern 
province. 
(m) A simple majority will be sufficient to determine the result of the 
referendum. 
(n) Meetings and other forms of propaganda, permissible witliin the laws of the 
country, will be allowed before the referendum. 
(o) Elections to provincial councils will be held within the next three months, 
in any event before December 31, 1987. Indian observers will be invited for 
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elections to the provincial council of the north and east. 
4. Strategy Based on Constitutional Arrangement 
In 1994 Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga led People's Alliance 
won the presidential elections and formed the government. One of the promises 
of the Chandrika's government was to transform Sri Lanka's 1978 Constitution 
(which was illiberal in nature) into a liberal democratic constitution that would 
protect the freedom of the individual while recognising community rights. 
Three types of reforms were proposed since 1995. 
(a) Provisions directed at democratising the institutions of the state; 
(b) Provisions to strengthen fundamental rights and the institutional safeguards 
of rights and justice in the judiciary; and 
(c) Provisions to increase the mechanisms for power sharing between the centre 
and the regions and within the regions themselves. 
The idea was to solve the problems in the South such as corruption, povert\, 
lack of economic inequalities and at the same time creating a framework of 
power sharing with the North and East.*' 
This was perhaps the most radical proposals for ending the ethnic 
conflict through a constitutional arrangement that is recognition of rights and 
democratizing the institutions in order to strengtlien the 'Devolution 
Package'programme as a draft document of the new government. This sought 
to redefine 'the constitutional foundation of a plural society'. The provincial 
councils of the 13''^  Amendment were renamed as Regional Councils with 
added powers.^ ** According to Rohan Edrisinha (noted Sri Lankan scholar): 
The deletion of Articles 2 and 76 of the constitution, which entrenched the 
unitary character of Sri Lanka, removed an unnecessary obstacle to substantial 
devolution. The abolition of the Concurrent List was another positive feature, 
as were other attempts to remove ambiguity in the division of powers. These 
included the clarification of the role of provincial governors and awarding of 
greater revenue raising powers to the regional council. 
Apart from Rohan Edrisinha, several other Sri Lankan scholars said that 
the reform proposal from 1995, which was incorporated in the draft 
constitution produced in 1997, represented the most far reaching attempt to 
share power as a means of ethnic reconciliation. It defined the nature of the 
state as a "union of regions". This draft constitution, in moving away from an 
entrenched unitary state, had brought about a paradigm shift in policy 
formulation toward a meaningful sharing of power between regions and 
communities."^^ 
The constitutional reform proposal was based on the realisation that one 
of the central problems of modern constitutionalism was to take aspects of 
recognition and cultural identity into account to contribute to reconciliation of 
ethnic conflict. In Sri Lanka, it was argued that the symbolic recognition and 
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acknowledgement of Tamil identity must precede negotiations on power-
sharing arrangements. 
The lack of sincerity from the side of Sri Lankan government's in 
accommodating the Tamil aspirations is a consequence of internal politics both 
within the Sinhala mainstream political parties and in the Tamil groups. The 
LTTE has also been equally guilty in not letting the political and constitutional 
process advance by refusing to get engaged in such a process, because it wants 
to keep its option of a separate state that represents only Tamil community. 
And for this reason they haven't shown any willingness towards any final 
political and constitutional settlement within the framework of a United Sri 
Lanka.^^ 
Thus there is a need for a concrete solution that would restore democratic 
freedoms, stability and ethnic harmony in a united and pluralistic Sri Lanka. 
iOf-^^f 
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Chapter-4 
SOLUTION MODELS 
Possible Solutions to Conflicts: 
Finding a solution to ethnic problem presents itself as a serious 
challenge. However, attempts that can possibly lead towards solutions must be 
examined. It can be said that most of the today's violence conflicts are 
basically internal in nature, but their possible outcome for either international 
peace keeping bodies or for neighbouring states, give it an international 
dimension. Several attempts are made from time to time to resolve the ethnic 
conflict in Sri Lanka. For instance the first initiative in the form of a 
'development council plan' was made in 1981. But it did not succeed as it failed 
to satisfy the Tamil demands since it was based upon district and not provincial 
autonomy. Second, many a time India had to mediate a settlement and the 
Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of 1987 under which India sent Peace Keeping Forces 
to Sri Lanka was an outcome of that attempt. Third, Norway acted as an 
external mediator to resolve the dispute between Sri Lankan Government and 
LTTE. But it also did not success because of narrow attitude of both the parties 
within the Nonvegian Peace proposal. Now many scholars, intellectuals and 
political leaders argue that if the Indian Federal system is adopted in Sri Lanka, 
it can resolve the ethnic dispute between Tamils & Sinhalese. 
Let us now discuss each of the solution models tried so far. 
1. Development Council Plan of 1981 
2. Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of 1987 
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3. 'Norway' Acts As The Mediator 
Development Council Plan of 1981 
In 1981, the Jayewardene regime proposed a system of district 
development councils. This later on became the District Development Councils 
Act. This Act established a system of councils with very limited powers. Their 
powers, duties, and functions were to approximate those carried out by the 
Town Councils and Village Councils, but excluded Municipal and Urban 
Councils.*The new Development Councils were to provide "a decentralisation 
of power and devolution of decision making authority to the regions". The 
Development Councils were to be democratically constituted decision-making 
bodies, composed of MP's from the district and an additional number of 
popularly elected members depending upon the population of the district, 
though normally not to exceed the number of MP's. 
The Chairman of the Council would be chosen directly by the people 
through proportional representation.^Each council had an executive committee 
consisting of the district minister, the chairman, and in most councils, two other 
members appointed by the minister in consultation with the Chairman and with 
the approval of the President.^ The executive committee was charged with 
executive functions in the district, while council as a whole perfoiTned 
legislative tasks. Their legislative powers were limited, with emphasis on 
control over industrial and agricultural development in their areas. However 
they \^ 'ere permitted some initiative and imagination in financial matters 
generally control over local budget, and active involvement in welfare, cultural, 
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and educational projects, such as planning and maintenance of local school and 
to provide more equal educational opportunities to all people. It would be 
responsible to hold festivals and cultural activities and work for religious 
welfare groups.'* 
This Development Council Plan for decentralisation was the result of 
extended and hard bargained negotiations between the government and 
spokesmen for the Tamil minority and Sinhalese majority.^ But this council 
plan was not regarded as institutions of regional autonomy, but as a body of 
decentralised administration effectively controlled by the central govemment. 
There were two main ill-intended objectives behind such a plan. The first was 
to show that the Tamils demand for autonomy was unjust and illegitimate 
because their claim to regional autonomy was a politically exaggerated 
manifestation of a developmental question. And the second was that in order to 
retain the unitary character of Sri Lanka polity, they allowed a limited 
decentralisation v^ -ith firm control by the centre.^Thus the Development Council 
Plan was not so effective to resolve the ethnic dispute between the Sinhalese 
and Tamils and the gulf of conflict widened day by day which ulfimately took 
the shape of armed struggle between the Sri Lankan Army and the Tamil rebel 
group. So in that situation India had intervened by sending the Indian Peace 
Keeping Forces (IPKF) to Sri Lanka to restore peace in the island and signed 
an historic Accord with Sri Lankan govemment known as "Indo-Sri Lankan 
Accord of 1987. 
Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of 1987 
The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord was signed between Rajiv Gandhi and 
Junius Richard Jayewardene on July 29, 1987 at Colombo.^ This accord ainjed 
at resolving Sri Lanka's ethnic crisis with the following provisions: 
(1) The Sri Lankan government would devolve local administration to elected 
provincial assemblies and provincial councils and so, it was hoped, satisfy 
Tamils aspirations for autonomy. 
(2) The Northern and Eastern provinces would be joined into a single 
administrative unit (now known as North-Eastem province).The merger would 
be subject to approval by a referendum in Eastern province. 
(3) Tamil would be recognised as an official language, along with Sinhalese 
and English. 
(4) Military hostilities would cease within 48 hours. Sri Lankan troops in the 
north and east would be confined to barracks in the north and east. 
(5) All TamiLs guerrilla groups would surrender their weapons to the Indian 
Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) who would guarantee law and order pending 
provincial elections.' 
However, the LTTE opposed the Accord on the following grounds. First, 
the agreement justified 'illegal Sinhala colonisation'of Northern and Eastern 
Provinces. Second, the Tamils were 'not recognised as a nation'. Third, the 
merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces was 'temporary, conditional and 
interim'. Fourth, the Accord envisaged the surrender of arms by the LTTE 
cadres, but there was no corresponding withdrawal of Sri Lankan troops from 
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the provinces. Thus the biased nature of the agreement created violence. By 
October 1987, the LITE was again at war, this time against IPKF rather than 
the Sri Lankan army. It took the IPKF nearly a month to capture the LITE 
stronghold in Jaffna by fighting a guerrilla war and losing about 1,000 soldiers. 
The Tamils also lost about 2,000 guerrillas and some 5,000 civilians. '^^  
Ranasinghe Premadasa who succeeded J.R Jayewardene had not made 
any secret of his personal opposition to the Accord. This drove partly from the 
personal feeling of anger from the side of Premadasa because Jayewardene had 
not consulted him during secret negotiations with New Delhi which badly 
damaged his pride and partly from a patriotic hostility to the presence of Indian 
troops on the Sri Lankan soil. This hostility was also shared by the Sinhalese 
public at large and by many, though not all, of the Tamils and it was believed 
that if Premadasa could secure the IPKF's eventual withdrawal, he would score 
a major political coup." 
In this, if nothing else, he shared a common interest with the LTTE, 
which had been seriously weakened by nearly two years of Indian counter-
insurgency operations, and on June 28, 1989 Colombo agreed to a 'permanent' 
ceasefire with the guerrillas. The ceasefire had little practical significance since 
the LTTE had still not renounced its demand for 'Eelam'and had in any case 
little contact with Sri Lankan armed forces since the Accord was 
operationalised. When Premadasa came to power, he claimed that he had 
achieved a national consensus on the issue that lent weight to his passionate 
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demands for the IPKF's withdrawal by the second anniversary of the Accord, 
at the end of July 1989.^ ^ 
'Norway' Acts As The Mediator 
In the aftermath of the political crisis created by the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan 
Accord and India's military intervention in 1988-89, both the Sri Lankan 
government and the LITE seemed to have opted for a strategy of 
deintemationalisation of the conflict. There was a strategic consensus between 
the Premadasa administration and the LITE to push the Indian Peace Keeping 
Forces out of the country in 1990 and neutralise the role of India in Sri Lanka. 
Once IPKF withdrew from the island, the war broke out between the Sri 
Lankan Army (SLA) and LITE in mid -1990 and continued until 1994.'^ 
When People's Alliance (PA) led by President Chandrika Kumaratunga 
came in power in 1994, her government signed a Cessation of Hostilities 
Agreement (CHA) with the LITE in early January 1995 to focus the role of 
external assistance to monitor the CHA. Thus a proposal emerged for a 
committee composed of representatives of the government, the LTTE, and 
foreign countries. The government and the LTTE approached the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to monitor CHA. But the ICRC refused on 
the grounds that it did not have the necessary military expertise to monitor a 
ceasefire. When the foreign delegates consisting of Canada, Netherlands and 
from Nordic countries arrived in Sri Lanka in mid-January, 1995 to chair the 
peace committee, a new controversy broke out. The LTTE alleged that the 
64 
government had deployed two of the foreign delegates in Trincomalee, 
Amparai, and Batticaloa districts without consulting the LTTE leadership. The 
LITE wanted that if the external peace monitors were neutral then why 
government acted unilaterally. With the LTTE's refusal to accept the peace 
monitors, the external role in ceasefire monitoring in the 1995 peace process 
came to an end. This crisis continued further when President Kumaratunga in 
February-March 1995 wanted to engage a French diplomat as a "mediator", 
between the government and LTTE, but again LTTE objected further. The 
future of Peace talk was in bleak, because the two sides were not enthusiastic 
. about reviving the talks through external assistance, although a number of 
countries offered their services.^'' 
Interestingly, in 2000-01, the President Chandrika Kumaratunga and the 
LTTE demonstrated greater acceptance of external engagement, but the 
question was reexamined that which country should act as a mediator on 
neutral line.'''The natural choice of the mediator should have been India, the 
big neighbour, with its close historical and ethnic relations. But now the Sri 
Lankan Government and the LTTE welcomed Norwegian Peace initiative 
rather than Indian.'^ 
Norwegian Peace Initiative: 
It should be noted that the Norwegian involvement started way back in 
late 1999, but the actual initiative process began from February, 2000. The 
Norwegian initiative of 2000 was a part of an international effort to deescalate 
the conflict in Sri Lanka Its peace negotiation envoy Eric Solheim hold many 
65 
round of discussions with President Kumaratunga in Colombo, LTTE's chiel 
Prabhakaran in Wanni and his close aide Balasingham in London. The main 
purpose of this peace initiative was to create a common ground and suitable 
conditions for political negotiations between the Sri Lankan government and 
the LTTE. But the Norwegian Peace Initiative was not so effective because ol 
two main reasons: First, though both parties appeared positive towards a peace 
process but due to their suspicion and each one's mutual desire to pattern the 
process on its own form posed a hurdle. The government was not utterly 
convinced that the LTTE was genuinely interested in negotiating a peace deal. 
It was not clear from the side of Tamil people that after this peace deal they 
renounce the Eelam goal. Second, Norway's chief facilitator Solheim became 
unpopular among the Sinhalese as he was suspected to be closer or sympathetic 
to the LTTE. Even some hard-liner in Sinhalese society opposed the 
Norwegian role; President Kumaratunga did not feel encouraged to commit 
herself to any de-escalation arrangement facilitated by Norway. Also there 
existed a fundamental difference between the government and the LTTE on 
Norway's role-the former wanted Norway merely to be a facilitator and, at the 
same time, the latter sought its mediation.'^ 
The above discussion shows that all three solutions were failed to resolve 
the crisis. Now a debate is going on among scholars, academicians, policy-
makers, researchers, and politicians within and outside Sri Lanka that whether 
the Indian Federal model can resolve the deadly ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka? 
This argument is being made because Sri Lanka like India is also a multi-
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cultural, multi-religious & multi-lingual country and India is considered as a 
success model in resolving deadly ethnic conflicts within the framework of its 
federal set up. In order to better understand this debate, it is necessary first of 
all to understand the meaning of federalism & viability of federalism as a 
conflict resolution tool and then focus on the nature of India's federalism and 
how federal India has been able to manage ethnic conflicts within the country. 
FEDERALISM: A Mechanism of Decentralisation 
The term federation is derived from the Latin word ''Foedus "which 
means treaty or agreement. Thus a state which is the result of a treaty or 
agreement is a federation. According to Nathan, "Federation is an aggregate of 
smaller states which while retaining each its separate identity are united 
together for common purposes in a nation which theoretically at least is 
indissoluble". In the words of Dicey, "Federalism means the distribution of the 
force of the states among a number of co-ordinate bodies each originating in 
and controlled by the Constitution". 
Why Federal Model? 
For effective management of ethnic minority in most democratic 
countries, federalism has been accepted as the best solution. In addition, for 
administrative convenience, countries prefer to have a federal political structure 
for effective planning and diverse development. In India, US, Canada, 
Australia, and Germany the federal system give much power to the 
decentralised units. These units have a defined territory, their own legislature; 
own executive and own courts and the federal government can only look after 
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the affairs of national importance such as foreign policy, defence, custodian of 
national purse (finance), interstate commerce, immigration policy, protection of 
fundamental rights, the national development plan etc, while the decentralised 
units may govern themselves and look after the matters related with local 
affairs such as education, law & order, newspaper, local self government, roads 
and transport etc. But they may look to the Central Government for additional 
financial resources through grant & aid, in order to meet their requirement for 
various project and development. 
Thus, Federal model reconciles the desire of political actors to be a part 
of a larger unit and yet a part of it. It combines the notions of "self-rule" and 
"shared-rule" in one unifying idea. It entails a clear-cut division of powers 
between the centre and the federating units and, as much as self-rule connotes 
autonomy and self-determination for the federating units, shared rule entails a 
stake for them at the centre and the ultimate responsibility of the centre for the 
preservation and protection of the democratic rights of all citizens, throughout 
the polity.** 
The Nature of India's Federal Arrangement 
The founding fathers of Indian Constitution wanted to strengthen the 
Union against possible disintegrative pressures. The drafting committee of the 
Constituent Assembly headed by Dr.B.R.Ambedkar said, '^  
. ..though India was to be a federation, the federation was not the resuh of 
an agreement by the states to join in a federation. Not being a resuh of an 
agreement, no state has a right to secede from it. Though the country and the 
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people may he divided into different states for convenience of administration, 
the country is one integral whole, its people a single people living under a 
single imperium derived from a single source 
The Drafting Committee thought it was better to make clear at the outset rather 
than leave it to speculation.... 
Thus the above statement of Ambedkar in this connection is the extent of 
poUtical centralisation in federal system. 
The nature of the federal system introduced by Indian Constitution has 
been examined below. 
(a) Indian federal system composed of one Central Government (New Delhi), 
and 28 State's Government. 
(b) Dual Government, means that we have a two sets of Government; Firstly. 
. Central Government and secondly, State Governments. Each with its own 
elected Legislature, an Executive and a seat of Judiciary (High Court).^' 
(c) Distribution of Powers, there is a distribution of powers between the centre 
and the states was laid down in the separate lists prepared for this purpose 
mainly, 
(i) Union List 
(ii)State List 
(iii)Concurrent List 
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(i)Union List 
The Union List includes 99 subjects over which the Union shall have 
exclusive power of legislation. These include defence, foreign affairs, finance 
(currency and coinage), banking & insurance, commerce, immigration policy, 
7.1 
• protection of fundamental rights, the national plan etc. 
(ii) State List 
The State List includes 61 subjects over which the State Legislature shall 
have exclusive power of legislation, such as agriculture, health & sanitation, 
law & order(police), local govemment,forests,fisheries,education, State taxes 
and duties, roads & transport, land and land revenue, industry and trade 
(limited);State Public Service Commission, Court (except Supreme Court) 
etc.^ ^ 
(Hi) Concurrent List 
The Concurrent List includes 52 items over which the States Legislature 
can also make laws along with the Centre, such as Criminal law and procedure, 
Civil procedure, marriage,contracts,torts,economic and social planning, trusts, 
commercial and industrial monopolies, welfare of labour, shipping and 
navigation on the inland waterways,drugs,ports, education etc. 
(d) In Indian federal system states were not 'sovereign', because under Indian 
Constitution it is not possible for the States of the Union of India, to exercise 
any right of secession. But under Indian Constitution, it is possible for Union 
Parliament to reorganise the States or to alter their boundaries, by a simple 
majority in the ordinary process of legislation Art.4 (2).^^ 
(e) No double citizenship, but only one citizenship, viz,-the citizenship of India 
Art.5, and birth or residence in a particular State does not confer any separate 
status as a citizen of that State. 
(f) No division of public services; Indian Constitution provides for the creation 
of All-India Services, but they are to be common to the Union and the State 
Art.312. Members of the Indian Administrative Services, appointed by the 
Union, may be employed either under some Department (say, Finance, Home, 
or Defence) or under a State Government, and their services are transferable, 
and even when they are employed under a Union Department, they have to 
administer both the Union and State. They can be dismissed or removed only 
by the Union Govemment.^^ 
(g) Existence of Apex Court (Supreme Court) in Indian Federal System, the 
apex judicial seat is headed by Supreme Court (located at New Delhi),will 
administer both.the Union and State laws as they are applicable to the cases 
coming up for adjudication. 
(h) During emergencies* Indian Constitution enables the federal government to 
acquire the strength of a unitary system because when a Proclamation of 
Emergency is made, the power to give directions extends to all matters and 
legislative power of the Union extends to State subject Art 353,354,357.While 
in normal times the Union Executive is entitled to give directions to the State 
Governments in respect of specified matters.^' 
(i) There were no specific provisions incorporated in constitution for religious 
or cultural minorities except that they were given equal rights.^" 
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(j) The principle of "Preventive discrimination" was applied in the case of 
scheduled caste and scheduled tribes that were more to undo their social and 
economic backwardness rather than them preserve and promote their cultural 
distinctiveness." * 
(k) There was an provisions for self-government under special administrative 
provisions for Jammu and Kashmir (Schedule IV, Art.370) and to the tribal 
areas of north east (Nagas, Mizos, Manipuri, Tripura under Art, 371 and 371A 
to 3711).^ ^ 
(1) There should be a 'Finance Commissions', appointed under the constitution 
(Arts.280,281, to decide distribution of taxes between the Union and the States 
as also grants-in-aid of the states out of the Consolidated Fund of India).^^ 
(m) The Indian federal structure, in some cases such as (language, culture and 
ethnic groups) even provides for such bargaining mechanism such as through 
the Inter-State Council (Art.263) or other bodies like National Development 
Council.^ "* 
(n) Allocation of economic resources by the Union to the states are carried out 
by the 'Planning Commission' (an autonomous body it self) in the area of 
developmental expenditure.^''' 
Thus India is a unitary federation that has a strong central government and 
weak federating units. Now it is worthwhile to examine how federal India has 
managed to contain ethnic conflict within the country. 
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Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Management in India 
In terms of ethnic situation, India presents one of the most complex and 
confusing picture due to its highly complex and colourful social mosaic. People 
belonging to specific religious, tribes, castes, races, and languages are found 
scattered in various territorial regions. This vast spread of cultural diversity and 
heterogeneity evolved composite culture of India that cannot be compared with 
the melting-pot of American society. This socio-cultural mosaic of India is the 
true picture of "unity in diversity", where every component while retaining its 
specific identity, is a part of a larger whole. India's ethno-communities have 
multi-layered and multi-dimensional identities which impinge on each other in 
a non-stratified and dynamic manner. Any diversity and heterogeneity is not 
conflictual per se, though it may carry a potential for conflict that led to 
secessionist tendency and sub-nationalism attitude which India has experienced 
from the time it declared itself a republic.^^ 
Secessionist movements in India draw their sustenance from ethnic. 
religious, cuhural factors and history plays a crucial role in fuelling anti-state 
sentiments. Apart from these factors, geo-politics and Kin-state intervention are 
some other factors contributing to secessionist expansion and contraction in the 
country. Although both secessionism and separatism are anti-state in nature but 
there is a fundamental difference between the two. Secessionism means 
complete independence, while separatism stands for greater autonomy within 
the mother country. In India four factors contributed to the rise of separatism 
that is ethnic diversity, regional economic disparity, manipulation of federal 
principle by the ruling Party of the Centre and hegemonic control of the state. 
Punjab, Kashmir and North-East are such prominent flash point of state 
uprising against the Union of India. These parochial and sub-nationalist attitude 
were contained through various measures but one of the most effective tool's of 
Indian government is 'Federal mechanism' through which New Delhi 
accommodated these ethno-cultural groups within the framework of 
federalism.^^ Let's discuss how federal structure played a critical role in 
accommodating these communities. 
Punjab 
The Sikh secessionism in Punjab was one of the most violent uprisings in post-
independence India. It claimed thousands of lives (including that of Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi). Due to their distinct ethnicity, religious belief, 
territorial concentration, economic self-reliance and support provided by third 
parties, the Sikhs were in a unique position to carve out their independent 
nation 'Khalistan'which posed a major threat to national unity and sovereignty 
of India. Indian economy was badly affected due to militancy in the state, 
because Punjab is regarded one of the most prosperous states in terms of 
agriculture production. In order to contain the ethnic secessionist demand of 
Sikhs, New Delhi first applied counter-insurgency methods to suppress such 
tendencies.^^ 
After successful military operations, Congress party, which was ruling at 
the centre at that time, conducted the election in Punjab that led to the Akali 
Dal to come to power and offered power sharing under the Constitutional 
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framework. The Congress also supported and offered full co-operation to the 
Akali's led government and ensured socio-economic progress of the state. It 
even appealed to all opposition parties to support the government to rebuild 
Punjab.^ '^  
The North-East 
The North-East consist of seven sister states which comprises of 6,387 km of 
'strategically sensitive' international frontier, shared by Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Burma and China. In ethno-religious terms it is equally diverse: with 209 
tribes, 257 recognised dialects.'*". Traditionally, the region was never fully 
integrated with the rest of India. Their facial out look is more toward Chinese 
and Burmese rather than Indian. When India territorially integrated herself it 
also took consideration of this strategically important region to being a part of 
India. The initial move of New Delhi, in this framework, was to win over the 
dissatisfied groups and communities. Since north easterners were difficult 
partners in the new nation, because they are distinct in every aspect with the 
rest of the country.'*' 
This was the reasons that led to the secessionist movement among the 
people of North-East such as Nagas, Mizos, Manipuri's, Kukis and Assamese. 
One such ethnic uprising of Mizo community is quite visible. The claims of an 
independent and separate Mizoram had gained momentum after a severe 
famine in the late 1950s. By the mid-1960s the Mizo National Volunteers, the 
armed wing of the movement, had seized the capital of Aizawal. They had, in 
their attempt to secede, taken control of other key towns in the Mizo Hills that 
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, ultimately resulted the growing militancy and violent insurgency in the 
region.''^ 
Meeting the challenges of a secessionist movement in Mizoram the New 
Delhi made a secret agreement in 1976 with Mizo National Front within the 
federal framework. Under this agreement, Mizoram was declared as an integral 
part of India in 1986 and acquired the status of 23'^ '^  state of the Indian Union. 
The leader of the Mizo National Front, Laldenga, became its chief minister. 
Today 84 percent of the Mizo people favours democratic governance and the 
majority see themselves as Mizos and Indians. Thus the creation of Mizoram as 
a separate state is the most striking case of successful accommodation within 
the federal framework which has helped to curb, or at least minimize, the 
dominance of the majority that controls the centre and provided space for 
different groups and communities to share power.''^ 
Kashmir 
The secessionist demand in Kashmir started since 1947 when India got 
independence from Britain. The Kashmiris demand for independence was 
based on the principles of ethnicity, religion, language, geography and the 
manner of its incorporation into India. In terms of intensity, the secessionist 
mood in Kashmir is very severe indeed. Soon ajfter it signed the instrument of 
Accession with India in 1947 secessionism gained momentum with the help of 
militancy in which thousand were killed. There is a civil war like situation in 
Kashmir. Most Indian feared that the separation of Kashmir could unveil an 
76 
India-specific domino effect. Given India's fragile ethno-religious profile, 
44 
Kashmir's exit would certainly lead to the fragmentation of the countr}'. 
New Delhi in order to curb the secessionist uprising in Kashmir first used 
the counter insurgency method with the help of Armed forces to crush the 
militancy. Besides India has revived democracy in Kashmir, undertaken 
various economic measures for the development of the state and started a 
political dialogue with Pakistan to resolve the issue.'*^ 
From the above discussion it can be said that New Delhi has adopted 
different tactics to prevent ethnic uprising in the countr>' that wasjntegsgand 
destructive to national unity and the democratic process. Undoubtly it has made 
some remarkable successes. 
If ethnic conflict management programme based on IndiaitvFedemi^exp^ience./ 
is adopted in Sri Lanka, can it solve the ethnic problem in that country? Before 
discussing this, it is important to mention that this is not for the first time, Sri 
Lankans are discussing about a federal solution. It may be recalled that Sri 
Lanka inherited a highly centralised political and administrative tradition from 
the withdrawing colonial power, at independence in 1948. In the decades 
following independence, contrary to the avowed intentions of the Sri Lankan 
political elite, there was not only a continuation, but an intensification of this 
tradition, with the adoption of mechanisms such as the executive presidency. 
Attempts at introducing a measure of decentralised functioning dictated by 
developmental as well as the ethnic factors were undertaken from time to 
time. Since 1926. Federalism was a lively issue in Sri Lanka, when S.W.R.D 
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Bandaranaike advocated the idea of federalism as a constitutional response to 
island's diversity. The Federal Party, which later on was transformed into the 
Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), had fought between 1949 and 1976 for 
a federal solution to accommodate the demands of the Tamil community. 
Bandaranaike argued against the centralised administrative system, which 
was the part of British colonial legacy, which according to him could not 
minimise the communal differences in the country but rather destroyed the old 
tradition of earlier existing Gram Sabhas (village councils) that allowed the 
island's communities for reaching autonomy.**^ The leader of the Federal Party 
S.J.V.Chelvanayakam fought for the uprising ethnic crisis, opting for a federal 
solution within a united nation. The proposal and demands of the Federal Party 
regarding a federal solution comprised four objectives: 
(a) Federalism or autonomy for the North-East 
(b) Equality and parity of status for Sinhala and Tamil. 
(c) Citizenship for all those who have made this country their permanent home. 
(d) Stopping all state-aided colonisation in the North-East, this changed the 
demographic pattern."*' 
When S.W.R.D Bandaranaike became Prime Minister in 1956 the 
establishment of a federal state, gained momentum to offered scope to both 
Sinhala and Tamil leaders. In 1957 Chelvanayakam and Bandaranaike entered 
into an agreement (the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact) pertaining to 
recognition of Tamil as the language of a national minority in Sri Lanka as well 
as establishment of regional councils with wide powers, delegated by 
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Parliament and dealing with lands, and development, colonisation and land 
alienation, education, co-operatives, health, fishing and social services etc. 
Draft legislation to give effect to the Pact was prepared by the Government and 
was ready by April 1958. But it could not successfully implemented because of 
two reasons; first during Bandaranaike's time the political atmosphere of the 
country was communalised ^^ and the second was that pact was not accepted by 
majority Sinhalese as well as hard liner Buddhist clergy (Bhikkus) because they 
considered 'regional council' deleted the unitary character of Sri Lankan polity. 
Moreover this kind of federal concept identified as separatism itself So in 
order to retain the unitary character of Sri Lankan state they never allowed its 
division into regions.'*'* 
But now the situation is different. The deadly ethnic conflict between 
the Sinhalese and the Tamils for the last several decades has made some 
scholars, academicians and policy-makers but even the people at the highest 
level of political leadership in Sri Lanka to realise the need for a federal 
framework based on Indian model to resolve the deadly ethnic conflict in that 
Island nation. As leader of opposition in the Sri Lankan Parliament Mr. Ranil 
Wickremesinghe has recently said that "safeguarding the territorial integrity of 
Sri Lanka we will make a close study of the Indian example of a three-tier 
system of devolution, because the post-independent political structures of India 
which provides regions with wide autonomous power within the "Union of 
India". The manner in which India has managed to democratically govem a 
nation of even greater diversity than our can provide a model for us. In this 
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context Sri Lanka has to ensure that the dignity and aspirations of all ethnic 
groups are met within, any new framework that is established".'*'^  However 
federalism as a possible solution for ending ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is now 
at the debating stage only. Much depends on how the LTTE that demands a 
separate Eelam for Tamils and the Government of Sri Lanka that is using brute 
force to contain the conflict actually agree on this important issue. 
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CHAPTER-S 
CURRENT SCENARIO 
As discussed in the preceding chapter that ahhough federalism is an 
important debate in Sri Lankan polity in order to resolve ethnic conflict, yet 
neither the Sri Lankan government nor the LTTE is actually serious to think on 
this matter because of their divergent perceptions on the issue. So the matter 
becomes worse day by day leading to further escalation of conflict between the 
Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE. This chapter analyses the current 
developments and trends about the peace process in Sri Lanka. 
In the last two decades, it seemed that much of the Sri Lankan polity 
had reconciled itself to federalism as an essential element of a solution to the 
Tamil question. The 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord was admittedly India-driven 
but slowly, even its opponents within the Sinhalese polity agreed with its basic 
principle of devolution. In 1994, President Chandrika Kumaratunga became the 
first mainstream Sri Lankan politician to articulate a non-chauvinistic solution 
to the ethnic conflict on truly federal lines. It is no secret that Ranil 
Wickremesinghe, the leader of the opposition United National Party (UNP), 
who had no known disagreement with devolution, scuttled the constitutional 
reforms for opportunistic reasons.' 
Crisis in Sri Lankan Politics-A Setback to Peace Process (2004) 
The political tug-of-war between the then Sri Lankan Prime Minister 
Ranil Wickremesinghe and the former President Chandrika Kumaratunga had 
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once again put the nation into an avoidable crisis. The announcement of snap 
polls and sacking of some Ministers by invoking presidential power had 
already weakened the Wickremesinghe Government. The rumour mongered 
about the sacking down of the Cabinet made the situation more difficult. 
Political observers described the move as unprecedented in the history 
of democracy where a Government was sacked while it enjoyed a majority in 
the House. Meanwhile, Sri Lanka's Tamil rebels-the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Ealam (LTTE)-vowed to uphold the truce with Government troops despite the 
dissolution of Parliament. The Tamil rebels saw the President's action against 
the Prime Minister, who was leading the bid to end the three decade old 
conflict, as a delaying tactic to reopen the negotiations. On the economic front, 
the announcement of snap polls had hit the panic button and sent shock waves 
in the capital market.^ 
The opinions was gaining ground that the President's decision to call 
for elections might delay the resumption of the peace talks and encourage those 
forces which were against any dialogue with the LTTE. Kumaratunga's 
Peoples' Alliance had formed an alliance with the radical Janatha Vimukthi 
Peramuna (JVP). The latter was finding it hard to sustain its anti-government 
campaigns mostly targeted against Wickremesinghe's initiatives to resolve the 
ethnic issue. Meanwhile, the ruling United National Front had accepted 
Kumaratunga's challenge of facing elections and was confident of returning 
with a more comfortable majority."* 
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Karuna's Revolt: A Setback to Tamil Eelam (April-2004) 
The LITE was in turmoil and, unfortunately, the situation was not 
created by any external forces but its own cadres. Supreme commander for 
eastern region, Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, better known as Karuna 
Amman or simply Colonel. Karuna had been expelled from the LTTE and even 
proclaimed as traitor for spearheading a revolt against their top leader 
Velupiilai Prabhakaran.^ 
Karuna retained effective control over the eastern region consisting of 
Batticaloa and Amparai and it was estimated that 7,500 Tiger cadres in the east 
strongly supported him. The Tamil area to the west of Batticaloa was Karuna's 
stronghold and his men were getting ready for war against Tamil guerrillas 
from the North.Interestingly, the man who once led his Eastern soldiers to the 
Northern battlefront and rescued his leader, was prepared to resist not the 
Sinhala State but his fellow Tamil rebels.^ Significantly, the split within the 
LTTE came to light when Karuna himself informed the Norwegian facilitators, 
who were involved in peace process with Sri Lankan Government to inform 
Colombo of the latest development.^ 
When the peace talks started, Karuna, along with political adviser 
Anton Balasingham, took over the charge of representing both the East as well 
as the military wing of the LTTE. Analysts pointed out the regional factor as 
one of the possible reasons of split in the LTTE cadres. There was a strong 
sense of underlying Eastern Tamil sub nationalism that often surfaced on 
account of supposedly big brotherly approach by the northern Tamils.Karuna 
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also alleged that of the 30 LITE departments, none was headed by an Eastern 
Tamils. The Batticaloa Tamils were peeved at the dominance of the Jaffna 
Tamils. And Karuna, the Prabhakaran's former blue-eyed boy, wanted to 
foment regional feelings to his advantage.^ 
To some extent, he succeeded in garnering support for his position vis-
a-vis the Eastern people. Notwithstanding his motive, few can deny that he had 
managed to strike a responsive chord. Was the LTTE leader passive to 
Karuna's challenge? Certainly not. It reflected that the surge of bloody 
Q 
conflicts within Tamil rebels was a setback to the peace process. 
The April 2004: ParUamentary Election 
Political upheavals were one of the major irritants in the peace process. 
The fracture verdict of the General election held on April 3, 2004 pointed out 
that Sri Lanka was a nation divided right down to the middle. Out of 225 seats 
in the Sri Lankan Parliament, 105 had gone to former President Kumaratunga-
led Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP). While Ranil Wickremesinghe's United 
Freedom Party had come second with 82 seats. The third major force in Sri 
Lanka politics, the Tamil Tigers, had bagged 22 seats, and the rest of the seats 
had gone to the smaller parties. This was historic election in the sense that it 
was being held against the backdrop of the peace talks with the Tamil Tigers."' 
The lack of clear mandate in the elections indicated primarily that the 
people were confused about the peace process. Should the peace process go on 
or should a hard-line stance be adopted against the Tigers? There was no dearth 
of acrimonious debate on this core issue, but the convincing answer still eluded 
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this island nation. Ciiandrika Kumaratunga's faction, with the help of 
maximum number of seats, had taken control over the country's Parliament. An 
opinion was being expressed that the peace process might get stalled 
indefmitely.Mrs. Kumaratunga had given assurance that when she came to 
power, she would resume peace negotiations on a priority basis, but it was sure 
that there were enough Sinhala hardliners, to prod her into a tough stand. 
In fact, her main poll plank was that the Prime Minister Rani! 
Wickremesinghe who had jeopardized national security by negotiating with the 
Tamil Tiger rebels. Analysts believed that Ranil Wickremesinghe's poor 
showing in the elections was because of his being seen as too soft on the 
Tigers. 
Fifth Presidential Election: (November 2005) 
The fifth Presidential election was held on November, 2005. That 
election was fought between two major allies led by Mahinda Rajapakse of Sri 
Lankan Freedom Party and Ranil Wickremesinghe's United National Party. 
The main issue of the election was the conflict resolution and economic 
development to lure the voters. 
Campaign strategy for both candidates: The unity of the nation was a key 
slogan; with both candidates emphasizing that they would ensure that the 
country was not divided. Mr.Rajapakse, with his accent on preserving the 
unitary state, had won over the minds of a majority of uncommitted voters in 
the Sinhala-majority districts. Mr. Wickremesinghe, who favoured power-
sharing, was preferred in the multi-ethnic electoral districts of the Island. 
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Critical factors: The approach of the two candidates in their 
negotiations with the LITE was seen as another critical factor. Voters favoured 
, Mr. Rajapakse because of his tough stand against rebels and would not 
compromise with security when dealing with the LITE but, 
Mr.Wickremesinghe's supporters said his approach was "pragmatic and 
practical" when dealing with LTTE. '^  
Both candidates promised to lower prices of essential commodities. 
Focus was also turned on the economy and cost of living. Mr.Rajapakse, who 
followed a left-of-centre path, was perceived as one who would move Sri 
Lanka away from "globalisation and economic dependence on the west."" 
Sinhalese small traders preferred him because Mr. Wickremesinghe "supported 
only the big businessman."*'* A minority Indian-origin Tamil community 
backed the former Prime Minister and Opposition leader. Rani! 
Wickremesinghe, in the presidential poll. The plantation Tamils comprises 
about 5.5 per cent of Sri Lanka's 19 million population and total 7.5 lakhs of 
the 13.32 million voters.*^ 
Traditionally supporters of the UNP, Mr.Wickremesinghe's alliances 
with two political parties representing the Estate Tamils-the Ceylon Workers' 
Congress (CWC) and the Up-Country Peoples' Front (UCPF)-had ensured that 
he retained the block vote of this constituency. The number of the plantation 
Tamil vote base defied easy count as the CWC had normally contested under 
the symbol of its major alliance partner.*** Mahinda Rajapakse, had promised to 
provide land to each plantation worker and free-hold rights to the land where 
90 
their dwellings exist-to name a couple. However, these had been blinded by the 
over-riding reality of Mr.Rajapakse's alliances with the Janatha Vimukthi 
Peramuna (JVP) and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU)-both of which advocated 
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Sinhala majoritarianism. 
The majority Sinhalese-Buddhists (69.3 per cent) were nearly equally divided 
between the two main parties, Mr.Rajapakse's SLFP and 
Mr.Wickremesinghe's UNP, making the role played by the other ethno-
religious groups critical in winning the election. 
The role played by the LTTE in influencing the Tamil voters' turnout 
in the north and east was another critical factor. A low turnout there affected 
the prospects of Mr.Wickremesinghe. The former LTTE regional military 
commander, V.Muralitharan ('Col.' Karuna) has appealed to the eastern Tamils 
not to boycott the election and vote for Mr.Rajapakse, as he had promised to 
review the ceasefire agreement between the Government and the LTTE. 
The Role of Rajapakse as Sri Lankan President 
A polarised Sri Lankan electorate had spoken. On November 18, Prime 
Minister Mahinda Rajapakse won the Presidency with a mandate that 
simultaneously reiterated and challenged a number of stereotypes. Even the 
Tamil "'Boycott" in the North-East, was a critical non-mandate of sorts that the 
new President had to factor in as he commenced charting the roadmap for what 
he described as a "new Sri Lanka."Mr.Rajapakse's victory with the narrowest 
margin in the history of elections for an Executive President made it clear that 
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there was no overwhelming support for majoritarianism of the variety 
advocated by the President's allies, the JVP and the JHU/^ 
Rajapakse's quest for peace: The President Rajapakse policy pronouncements 
indicated his plan to change the critical concepts on vital Sri Lankan issues: 
conflict resolution and socio-economic management. They represented 
continuity with his manifesto's promised of adopting a tough negotiating 
position to solve the separatist conflict and pursued a populist measures to 
change the island-nation's socio-economic landscape. 
Mr.Rajapakse's approach to conflict-resolution is one of 
accommodating majorities and minorities within a multi-ethnic Sri Lanka.This 
contrasts with the LTTE's assertion in 1988 after the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord 
that "the problem of the people of Tamil Eelam is national problem," which 
was "concerned with the fundamental political rights of a national self-
determination of that people."'^'' His most difficult task has been to resume 
negotiations with the LTTE, or, at the least, avoid a setting that could be 
internationally portrayed by the Tigers as a "justification to resumed armed 
struggle." The policy statement represented a set of ideals for what 
Mr.Rajapakse saw as the "New Sri Lanka."These envisaged, among others, 
safeguarding the "unitary nature of the state" and "people's national identity" 
with "maximum devolution of power within an undivided sovereign 
democratic republic."'^' 
Two guiding concepts for conflict resolution listed by new President 
were: "consensus" and "majority-approval." Mr.Rajapakse's manifesto broadly 
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sequenced his approach as working for a southern consensus in about three 
months and along the line moving towards commencement of direct talks with 
the LTTE. The other hurdle that Mr.Rajapakse was confronted with his 
attempts to translate his idea of "maximum devolution" within a "unitary 
nature of the state" into an acceptable solution. As is evident, the most that the 
present Sri Lankan unitary state has offered was the India-mediated Provincial 
Councils system under the 13 Amendment. 
His intention to appoint a commission to "re-demarcate" the divisions, 
districts, and provinces to reflect, among others, current "political 
requirements" for democratic grassroots participation in development was 
another potentially sensitive issue requiring further elucidation. The President's 
ability to deliver on his promise of a new peace process largely depended on 
how he put forward and negotiated the core issues of the conflict with two 
critical political extremes: the southern hardline dissidents and the LTTE." 
Mr.Rajapaksa underlined the urgent need for linking the traditional 
local governance systems with the country's central system of administration 
so that the Centrally-sponsored development schemes reached the remotest 
village and town .Sri Lanka was studying India's Panchayati Raj experienced 
to take lessons from it and evolve its own model of maximum devolution 
within a unitary State.^^ 
The Peace Process and Violence by The LTTE 
LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran's annual speech on 
November 27 threatened to intensify violence unless a 'reasonable political 
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framework' was put forward by the government in 2006. Thereafter there was a 
surge in violence, largely attacks by the LITE against civilians, security forces 
and police personnel, and between the LTTE and the militia of LITE renegade 
Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan ('Colonel Karuna'), largely believed to be 
supported by the security forces. Tamil groups also alleged that disappearances 
and abductions were simultaneously being carried out by security personnel or 
affiliated paramilitary groups.^ ** 
The war had been fought between the Sri Lankan military and the 
LTTE in the east and the north of the country in violation of the five-year -old 
Norwegian-brokered ceasefire, along with a 'dirty war' carried out by both 
sides' secretive paramilitary forces. There were human-rights violations on 
both sides, and allegations of recruitment of child soldiers by the LTTE and 
attacks on civilians by the military. According to the Sri Lanka Monitoring 
Mission (SLMM), over 4,000 people were killed in the 15 months to February 
2007.Tens of thousands were displaced from their homes. In a defiant 
statement on November 27, 2006, LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran declared 
that President Mahinda Rajapakse had rejected his call to find an urgent 
solufion to the conflict, instead intensifying the war. Prabhakaran said the 
ceasefire agreement had 'become defunct' and the people of Tamil Eelam had 
only one option: 'political independence and statehood'.^'' 
Although an LTTE spokesperson subsequently clarified that this did not 
mean that it had with-drawn from the ceasefire agreement, the statement 
nonetheless provoked the military to announce plans to intensify operations in 
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the east, to be followed by clearance of the LITE from the north. The 
government became increasingly concerned by suicide attacks by the LTTE's 
naval arm, the Sea Tigers, on patrol boats and ports, along with harassment of 
fishermen in the area. Smuggling of weapons and military equipment in 
support of LTTE operations was also believed to take place across the Palk 
Strait.^^ 
LTTE's Air Power Capabilities (March 2007) 
The LTTE scored a psychological victory over the government with its 
air strike on a Sri Lanka Air Force base at Katunayake, near the only 
international airport the island-nation has, located 30 kilometers away from 
Colombo, the national capital, presumably from the territory under its control 
in the north. The post-mortem of the March 26 strike by experts had revealed 
that there was nothing extraordinary in the Tiger venture. It is now 
acknowledged that the Tigers had acquired some air capabilities by March 
2005.^'' 
The astonishing aspect was the failure of the Sri Lanka state to intercept 
the mission at any point. That an aircraft or two could take off from jungles far 
away from the outside world, travelled at least 400 km,bombed the main air 
base and sneak back to the original destination after being in the air space for at 
least two hours, is a telling commentary on the defence preparedness of 
Colombo.^" 
Death of Thamilselvan: A Blow to the LTTE (November 2, 2007) 
Tamil Tiger extremists have suffered a major blo\v in their 24->ear 
fight for independence after the organisation's political chief and de facto 
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number two S.P.Thamilselvan was killed in a dawn raid by Sri Lankan Air 
Force jets. The death of Thamilselvan, who was the public face of the LITE, 
and represented the organisation at peace talks in Geneva last year, marked a 
dangerous escalation in the conflict which had claimed 5,000 lives since mid-
2006. "The loss of Thamilselvan in this way was a very big setback to any hope 
of peace talks in the near future.^' 
Although a political negotiator for the LTTE, which is led by the 
elusive Velupillai Prabhakaran, Thamilselvan had been an active combatant, 
leading an offensive on an army camp in 1993 and surviving a bomb attack in 
2002.In recent years, while Thamilselvan acted as the de facto prime minister 
for the LTTE, he still carried the rank of "Brigadier", the highest in the Tamil 
Tiger military hierarchy. His death, following that of his mentor, the former 
LTTE chief negotiator Anton Balasingham who died in London from cancer 
left the senior Tiger leadership looking increasingly isolated.^^ 
Unending War Scenario (2008) 
On the brink of war in 2006, an undeclared war in 2007escalated in the 
form of all -out war in 2008. The New Year dawned with the assassination of 
United National Party (UNP) Member of Parliament T.Maheshwaran in broad 
daylight inside a temple in Colombo, the capital. The next day, an explosion in 
the heart of the city, targeted a military vehicle, killed four people, including a 
soldier.^^ 
The Mahinda Rajapaksa government blamed the LTTE for both the 
incidents and lobbed a political grenade by pulling out of the Norwegian-
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brokered 2002 Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) with the Tigers. For all practical 
purposes, the CFA was a dead article, observed more in the breach than in 
practice by both parties, particularly since the escalation of hostilities in mid-
2006. Yet, the government's decision to remove the fig leaf triggered strong 
disapproval from the international community. 
The Tigers were not expected to crumble without causing maximum 
possible bloodshed. For all the losses it had suffered, the LTTE continued to 
have the capability to wage a conventional war in the north, fight 
unconventional battles in the east, and carried out hit-and-run and suicide 
missions in the south. In other words, a blood-bath was inevitable before the 
Sri Lanka military could possibly barge into LTTE-held territory in Kilinochchi 
and MuIIaithivu districts. The failure of the government so far to come out with 
a credible political package to address the legitimate grievances of the 
minorities made the task of isolating (or Colombo's ambitious goal of 
annihilating) the Tigers tougher.^^ 
End of the Game at Kilinochchi: A Major Set-back for LTTE (January 3, 
2009) 
LTTE 'non-negotiating approach' with Sri Lankan government and its 
declaration of full fledge war with Sri Lankan state has boosted the 
temperament of Sri Lankan Army (SLA). The Army retaliated against LTTE 
offensive design. A proactive military operation by the Sri Lankan Army gave 
the rebel group a sort of challenge. One of such successful operations took 
place when Sri Lankan Army captured the town of Kilinochchi, which was 
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regarded the de facto capital of LTTE's Utopian state of 'Eelam.'Sri Lankan 
soldiers took full control of political and administrative headquarters of the 
rebel group.^^ 
• The defeat of the Tigers in Kilinochchi capped a series of military 
victory by the forces in the east and the north since the current phase of 
hostilities began in July 2006. With the loss of Kilinochchi and all major bases 
in the district, the Tigers are now confined to the jungles of Mullaithivu 
district. President Rajapakse said it's victory for nation, since Kilinochchi 
comes under the control of LTTE in 1990 when Sri Lankan Army (SLA) with 
drew its garrisons after the departure of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) 
from Sri Lanka. 
The Fall of Jaffna Peninsula 
After the successful military operation in Kilinochchi, Sri Lankan 
Armed Forces has captured Jaffna Peninsula.^^ It is only a matter of short time 
before the cadres of the LTTE are confined to the jungles of Mullaithivu. I he 
organisation would still have some residual fighfing capability-in the guerrilla 
mode and also through its trademark human bomb terrorism. The other 
resources they would be counted on are the civilian human shield within the 
small territory it still holds. But President Rajapakse has instructed the armed 
forces to follow a 'Zero Civilian Casualty Policy'. He has pledged that his 
government would accept responsibility to ensure civilian "safety and 
freedom" now and in the future.^* However, as the war between the 
Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE enters into the decisive stage. 
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President Rajapaksa's greatest challenge is to reach a political settlement with 
Sri Lanka's marginalised,intimidated and livid Tamils. If he masters it, he will 
be remembered for bringing peace to Sri Lanka otherwise, for war. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ethnic Conflict is a socio-political phenomenon in most civic societies and in 
the present century inter-ethnic cleavages, competition and conflict appear to 
have acquired a marked intensity. Furthermore, ethnic conflicts have become 
one of the main threats to security and order on the national and global levels. 
They are far more frequent than inter-state wars, involving both a major \oss of 
life and a major transformation of the state itself. In fact, ethnic conflict's 
effects on a polity parallel the system-transforming effects of global war. It has 
been observed that democracies less engage in internal war as compared to 
autocracies because democracies are more pacific in their internal relations. 
The democratic participation and responsiveness make resolution of conflict 
without violence possible which is not possible in authoritarian regime. 
Derived from the Greek word "ethnikos", ethnicity refers to 'nation' or a 
group, the components of which are race, descent and culture. However, 
ethnicity has more to do with self-perception (identity) and subjective sense of 
shared identity based on objective cultural or regional criteria. Ethnicity, in this 
sense refers to the use of these symbols for the mobilisafion of a group in order 
to achieve certain socio-economic and political objectives. 
When an ethnic group makes demand for equitable distribution of 
resources and benefits, it obviously comes into conflict with the state because 
the state is primarily responsible for affimiative action. The use of coercive 
power by the state brings it into conflict with the agitating ethnic groups. These 
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ethnic groups also indulge in conflicts with other ethnic groups particularly the 
majoritarian ethnic groups. The advantaged ethnic groups may also use ethnic 
factor due to their rising expectations. Thus, ethnicity not only affects state-
society relations but also poses a serious challenge to the very basis of nation-
state. 
In the above backdrop, this study entitled as "Ethnic Conflict in Sri 
Lanka: Problems and Prospects", first of all, examined different theoretical 
traditions on ethnic conflict such as Realism, Liberalism, Marxism, 
Constructivism and Democratic Peace Theory. It found that although these 
theoretical discourses help us in understanding ethnic conflict in their own 
ways but they are not mutually exclusive. Taken together they provide a 
comprehensive account of ethnic conflict in the world. 
On the origin and nature of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, the study found 
that during the British rule in the island nation majority Sinhalese were 
discriminated in the hands of colonial master, but after independence in 1948. 
the majority led Sinhalese regime discriminated the minority Tamils in the 
realm of education, employment, language and religion. Overwhelming 
Sinhalese majority in the legislature operated in a manner as to provide 
patronage to their own support base. Further, the unitary framework of the 
island state denied the minority Tamil community the advantages of regional 
autonomy. Due to the biased policies of the government, the Tamils mobilised 
their own ethnic identity and launched a massive campaign against government 
and took up arms in their hands that resulted in a widespread communal 
104 
violence and militancy. They demanded for a separate Eelam for Tamils. This 
resulted in massive inter-community tension and failure of law and order in the 
country. 
In order to combat the growing Tamil militancy, the Sri Lankan 
Government adopted various strategies such as use of force, enactment of anti-
terror laws, constitutional accommodation and political dialogue. But they 
failed to resolve the crisis because there was a lack of sincerity on the part of 
both the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE. 
Then the study analysed various solution models tried from time to time 
such as the 'Development Council Plan of 1981', The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord 
of 1987' and 'The mediation by Norway which also failed to resolve the 
ongoing ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka because of the opportunism and insincerity 
on the pait of both the LTTE and Government of Sri Lanka. Recently, another 
solution model called the 'Indian Federal Model' is being debated for ending 
ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. This argument for Indian model is made because 
Sri Lanka like India is also a multi-cultural, multi-religious and multi-lingual 
country. India is also considered as a success model in resolving deadly ethnic 
conflicts within the framework of its federal set up. It may be mentioned that 
even the highest political leadership in Sri Lanka have realised the need for 
such a solution for permanently resolving the issue. But it depends on how the 
LTTE that has demanded a separate Eelam for Tamils and the Government of 
Sri Lanka that is using brute force to contain the conflict actually agree on this 
important issue. 
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Now the conflict in Sri Lanka has entered into a critical stage. A 
serious fighting has erupted between The Government of Sri Lanka and the 
LTTE. Now it seems that in this ongoing conflict, The Sri Lankan Government 
has been able to get on upper hand vis-a-vis the LTTE. But it remains to be 
seen weather the defeat of the LTTE by the Sri Lankan Army will end the 
Tamil Eelam movement once for all or sow the seeds of a larger conflict in Sri 
Lanka in future. 
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